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INTRODUCTION
A. The Defective Doctrines of Equal Protection Law
The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees that "no state shall.., deny
to any person within its jurisdiction equal protection of the laws."3 The
special relevance of the Equal Protection Clause to black Americans, most
of whom were recently emancipated slaves when the provision was adopted
in 1868, is beyond serious question. In 1872, the Supreme Court suggested
that white supremacist discrimination was "the evil [the Civil War Amend-
ments] were designed to remedy,"4 and eight years later it noted that it was
"the colored race for whose protection the [Fourteenth] Amendment was
primarily designed."5 Even this fundamental premise, however, did not
suggest to the Court in the 1896 case of Plessy v. Ferguson that legally im-
posed racial segregation violates the Equal Protection Clause.6 It took
nearly a century after the Civil War ended for equal protection doctrine to
begin to embrace even a modest notion of substantive equality. The War-
ren Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education7 was widely received
as the harbinger of a new judicial commitment to make good on the Four-
teenth Amendment's long-obscured promise.8 The Burger Court, how-
ever, wounded Brown's potential and the Rehnquist Court has very nearly
eviscerated it. Today, innovative theories of equal protection - namely, the
doctrines of intent and colorblindness - comprise "a more sophisticated
approach" to toleration of racial discrimination and inequity.9
In this article, I join those who have asked how and "why equal pro-
tection no longer protects,"1 and I offer, in the context of race law, a uni-
fied explanation of that failure's causes and mechanisms. My theory is that
each of the major doctrinal problems is both a function and a deployment
of willful ignorance. The vocabulary of my critique consists of words like
amnesia and myopia, forgetting and ignoring, consciousness and uncon-
sciousness, for by ignorance I do not mean a simple lack of knowledge.
Ignorance is not always - indeed, usually never is - a blank slate waiting to
be filled with facts or wisdom. What I mean here by ignorance is a psycho-
3. U.S. CONST., amend. XIV, § 1.
4. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 72 (1872) ("We do not say that no one else but the
negro can share in [their] protection, but ... in any fair and just construction of any section or
phrase of these [Civil War] amendments, it is necessary to look to the purpose which we have said
was the pervading spirit of them all, the evil which they were designed to remedy.").
5. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 306 (1880).
6. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
7. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
8. Judge Earl Pollack, who was Chief Justice Earl Warren's law clerk when Brown was de-
cided, remembers that "the day [the opinion] was announced ... it was glorious news.... Many
of us ... naively thought the world would be transformed." Robert Carter, who worked on the
case while an attorney at the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, remembers, "Everyone thought the
[civil rights battle] was over." Wendell LeGrand, Brown at 50, A.B.A. J., Apr. 2004, at 39.
9. Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination
Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE WRITINGS
THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT 29, 41 (Kimberl6 Williams Crenshaw, Neil Gotanda, Gary Peller,
& Kendall Thomas, eds., 1996).
10. See, e.g., Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of
Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111 (1997). Siegel insightfully reasons that out-
ward changes in the rules and rhetoric of personal status have served to preserve, in almost every-
thing but name, an unequal status regime.
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logical state akin to what the law calls "willful blindness," an ignorance
whose authenticity is questionable in light of one's actual or perceived
stake in its perpetuation.
The ignorance theory presented in this article draws heavily on the
work of constitutional scholars and critical race theorists who have convinc-
ingly explained why contemporary equal protection law is internally inco-
herent, radically conservative, and morally reprehensible. Ignorance is not
explicitly central to any of these critiques, but as a trope it has been useful
to practically all of them. My goal in this piece is to raise ignorance from a
valuable motif in academic analysis of equal protection law to an essential
tool in explaining what's gone wrong.
B. Willful Ignorance
Michel Foucault famously observed that "there is no binary division to
be made between what one says and what one does not say."11 The same
can be said of knowledge; i.e., there is no binary division between what one
knows and what one does not know. Insofar as knowledge provides our
means for understanding the world and negotiating our places in it, igno-
rance and knowledge are analytically equivalent: both equally impact what
we think and what we do. A concrete illustration of the equivalence is the
use to which ignorance is put in the political philosophy of John Rawls.
Although the kind of ignorance he employs - the blank-slate variety - is
not the kind I will emphasize in the present study of equal protection law, it
amply demonstrates how ignorance functions as knowledge. Observe how
Rawls describes the theoretical standpoint from which a just social contract
may be formed:
[In t]he original position, with the feature I have called the "veil of igno-
rance," ... the parties are not allowed to know the social positions or the
particular comprehensive doctrines of the persons they represent, [nor
their] race and ethic group, sex, or various native endowments such as
strength and intelligence... We express these limits on information figur-
atively by saying the parties are behind a veil of ignorance.12
For Rawls, the knowledge best suited to our reaching agreement about ba-
sic entitlements in an ideal society is, so far as certain matters are con-
cerned, no knowledge whatsoever.' 3 Rawls correctly perceives that the
essential distinction between ignorance and knowledge (in the traditional
sense of "knowledge") has to do with how each impacts human choice, not
whether each impacts it - the difference is qualitative, not practical.
The functional equivalence of ignorance and knowledge forces us to
rethink the complicated relationship between politics and epistemology.
11. MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY 27 (Robert Hurley trans., Vintage
Books, 1990) (1978).
12. JOHN RAwLs, JusncE AS FAIRNESS 15 (ed., Erwin Kelly 2001).
13. Professor Peter Rubin noted in response to this characterization that the colorblindness
doctrine, which essentially asks state actors to act "as if they didn't know" is an unlikely sibling of
Rawls' "veil of ignorance" concept. Like the veil of ignorance, colorblindness is premised upon
the belief that we'll arrive at the right answers so long as we remember to forget certain things.
Of course, the major difference between the veil of ignorance and colorblindness is that the for-
mer seeks to "preempt" discrimination from a hypothetical, antediluvian point called the original
position, while the latter seeks to fix damage that's already been done. Conversation with Peter
Rubin, Professor, Georgetown University Law Center, in Washington, D.C. (Mar. 2004).
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Thus one can understand Foucault's assertion that "[k]nowledge is never
anything more than a weapon in a war, or a tactical deployment within that
war'14 as an improvement on the oft-heard but overly simplistic maxim,
"knowledge is power." Following Foucault, Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick de-
scribes in her tellingly-titled Epistemology of the Closet how "ignorance
and opacity collude or compete with knowledge in mobilizing the flows of
energy, desire, goods, meanings, and persons," and she concludes that both
"can be harnessed, licensed, and regulated on small and large scales for
striking enforcements."' 5 Sedgwick's first illustration is innocuous (and
now dated), but its implications are broad: "If M. Mitterrand knows En-
glish but Mr. Reagan lacks - as he did lack - French, it is the urbane M.
Mitterrand who must negotiate in an acquired tongue, the ignorant Mr.
Reagan who may dilate in his native one." 6 Thus it was the American
President's ignorance as much as the French President's connaissance that
allowed the former to "define the terms of [their] exchange."17 Still, like
ignorance in Rawls' original position, Reagan's inability to speak French is
ignorance as we usually understand it' 8 - whatever else may be said of his
political motives, the Great Communicator did not pretend to be monoglot
during visits to the Elys6es Palace.
But ignorance isn't always so innocent. "Willful ignorance" is the des-
ignation I've chosen to describe those more questionable, sometimes even
sinister, forms of what Sedgwick calls "unknowing."' 9 The defining feature
of willful ignorance, as the term is used here, is the investment its bearer
has in it. But for the benefits that accrue from this ignorance, it would be
readily abandoned in favor of some other, presumably more useful, knowl-
edge. As we'll see, a willful ignorance can be a knowledge that is "merely"
unexamined; it can also be consciously or unconsciously willed, or even
patently phony. This last kind - the patently phony - corresponds to the
rather ridiculous notion that Reagan feigned ignorance of French when he
negotiated with Mitterrand. Though the idea sounds silly in that context,
such pretense is actually quite common.2" Nonetheless, I will assume (per-
haps generously) that the Justices of the Supreme Court are not so duplici-
14. Michel Foucault, Lecture (February 25, 1976) in MICHEL FOUCAULT, "SocIETY MUST BE
DEFENDED": LECTURES AT THE COLLtGE DE FRANCE, 1975-1976 167, 173 (Mauro Bertani &
Alessandro Fontana eds., David Macey trans., Picador 2003).
15. SEDGWICK, supra note 2, at 3-4. Sedgwick treats Foucault's theories of knowledge and
power as "axiomatic."
16. Id. at 4.
17. Id., quoting Sally McConnell-Ginet in CHERIS KRAMARAE & PAULA A. TREICHLER, A
FEMINIST DICTIONARY 264 (Boston: Pandora Press 1985).
18. The first definition of "ignorant" (as an adjective) in the Oxford English Dictionary is
"destitute of knowledge, either in general or with respect to a particular fact of subject; unknow-
ing, uninformed, unlearned..." OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 640 (2d ed. 1989).
19. SEDGWICK, supra note 2, at 77.
20. It can be exciting to pretend you don't know something. It can also be useful, like when a
Parisian panhandler asks me for money in French (which I speak) and I respond (in English), "I
don't speak French." Such pretense can also be empowering; Sedgwick notes that the glass closet
- the phenomenon where a homosexual isn't "out" even though her homosexuality is somehow
evident to everyone - "can license insult ('I'd never have said those things if I'd known you were
gay!' - yeah, sure); it can also license far warmer relations, but [ones] whose potential for ex-
ploitativeness is built into the optics of the asymmetrical, the specularized, and the inexplicit." Id.
at 80.
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tous,21 and that they instead suffer from the two other kinds of willful
ignorance just mentioned: the "merely" unexamined and the willed, both
of which closely resemble Jean-Paul Sartre's description of bad faith, where
"the one to whom the lie is told and the one who lies are one and the same
person. 2
2
To repeat the essential point: inherent in all these ways of describing
the phenomenon of willful ignorance is an emphasis on stakes. With
Sedgwick, I insist that when benefits attach to a lack of self-awareness, to
misperceptions of the world around us, or to ignorance of our past, we had
best be skeptical.
Identifying willful ignorance at work is not always easy, especially at
the level of constitutional doctrine. As Sedgwick writes, "although the sim-
ple, stubborn fact or pretense of ignorance ... can be enough to enforce
discursive power, a far more complex drama of ignorance and knowledge is
the more usual carrier of political struggle. '' 23 She cites the majority opin-
ion in Bowers v. Hardwick, a dazzling demonstration of what Justice Black-
mun's dissent called, in the spirit of this article, "the most willful
blindness: 24
In [Justice] White's opinion, "to claim that a right to engage in sodomy is
'deeply rooted in this nation's history and tradition' or 'implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty' is, at best, facetious."
What lends the word "facetious" in this sentence such an unusual power
to offend ... has to be the economical way it functions here as a switch
point for the cyclonic epistemological undertows that encompass power
in general.... One considers: (1) prima facie, nobody could, of course,
actually for an instant mistake the intent of the gay advocates as face-
tious. (2) Secunda facie, it is thus the court itself that is pleased to be
facetious.... (3) [The] assertion's ... transparent stupidity [is] not just [a]
contemptuous demonstration that powerful people don't have to be acute
or right, but even more, [a] contemptuous demonstration ... of how ob-
tuseness itself arms the powerful against their enemies.25
Thus Sedgwick identifies for her readers "the degree to which the
power of our enemies over us is implicated, not in their command of
21. For example, when I argue later that Justice O'Connor's opinion in Croson v. Richmond
manifests an egregiously willful ignorance of history, I take for granted that, in some important
sense, she "believes" what she writes - that she is not just performing ignorance in order to
achieve what she knows to be racist ends. As Duncan Kennedy writes of judges' denial of the
political nature of their decisions, "[i]t is not a conscious, deliberate, strategic misrepresentation,
not a lie designed to deceive an audience without the speaker having any belief at all in its truth."
DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION 193 (1997). Girardeau Spann might question
the application of Kennedy's description of judicial denial to the Supreme Court's decisions on
race: "Although it is always possible to articulate nonracial motives for the Court's civil rights
decisions, the popular perception is that a politically conservative majority wishing to cut back on
the protection of minority interests at majority expense now dominates the Court." GIRARDEAU
SPANN, RACE AGAINST THE COURT: THE SUPREME COURT AND MINORITIES IN CONTEMPORARY
AMERICA 1 (1993). In some sense, this article attempts to mediate between the visions articulated
by Kennedy and Spann, using the concept of "willful ignorance" to explain how the Court is able
to cover racial motives, consciously or unconsciously, in nonracial terms.
22. JEAN-PAUL SARTRE, BEING AND NOTHINGNESS 89 (Hazel E. Barnes trans., Washington
Square Press 1992) (1943).
23. SEDGWICK, supra note 2, at 6.
24. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 205 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
25. SEDGWICK, supra note 2, at 6-7 (emphasis added).
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knowledge, but precisely in their ignorance."26 That Justice Blackmun
should have described this very phenomenon as "the most willful blind-
ness" points to a conflation of sorts that this article not only adopts, but
self-consciously embraces - namely, the rhetorical equivalence of igno-
rance with sightlessness. The relative interchangeability of these concepts
probably relates to our culture's intuitive trust in a correlation between
seeing and knowing. 27 The sentiment "I'll believe it when I see it" embod-
ies a popular, if philosophically embattled, tenet of Western epistemol-
ogy,28 one that has explicit incarnations in law. Not only does the common
criminal law use "willful blindness" and "willful ignorance" to describe the
same culpable mental state,29 the most persuasive evidence admitted in a
trial is "proof corroborated by the eye: the most authoritative testimony is
that of an eyewitness. 30
As noted earlier, the law incorporates a notion of guilty ignorance. In
the criminal law - though not, interestingly, in the field of legal ethics31 -
the doctrine of "willful ignorance" states that when a person contrives her
own ignorance, when she intentionally avoids learning a fact whose knowl-
edge would make her subsequent conduct knowingly illegal, that ignorance
is legally equivalent to knowledge. Under one interpretation, the willful
ignorance/blindness doctrine would apply in situations where "the wrong-
doer didn't know, [but] should have known. '32 But this rendering doesn't
convey the necessary connotation of guilty intuition; as David Luban ex-
plains, it sounds an awful lot like negligence. 33 The Model Penal Code has
suggested that willful blindness isn't really the equivalent of knowledge,
but is rather "awareness of the high probability of a fact" whose confirma-
tion the wrongdoer has somehow arranged to avoid.34 Distinct though they
are, these legal conceptions of willful ignorance share at least one necessary
implication: the wrongdoer's "ignorance" is motivated by self-interest, and
in this sense both definitions resonate with my use of the expression here. I
have addressed the law's understanding of "willful ignorance" not to indi-
cate an intent to analyze equal protection doctrine according to standards
derived from criminal law, but to emphasize that this concept of willful
ignorance is familiar to members of a legal community who are generally
26. Id. at 7.
27. In an English Christian text from the fourteenth century, we read "Be blynd in Igno-
rance." RICHARD ROLLE DE HAMPOLE, PSALTER, C. xlv. 6. (1340) (Clarendon Press, 1884). Hun-
dreds of years later, when the American poet Wallace Stevens wrote of "seeing the sun again with
an ignorant eye" in order to see the sun more truly, he was self-consciously and ironically over-
turning what was by 1947 a deeply ingrained trope. Wallace Stevens, Notes Toward a Supreme
Fiction (1947), in WALLACE STEVENS, THE PALM AT THE END OF THE MIND: SELECTED POEMS
AND A PLAY 207 (Holly Stevens ed., Vintage Books 1971).
28. See generally, The Ways of Understanding in MELVIN RADER & JERRY H. GILL, THE
ENDURING QUESTIONS: MAIN PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 49 (5th ed. 1991).
29. See David Luban, Contrived Ignorance, 87 GEO. L.J. 957, 959 (1999).
30. FELMAN, supra note 1, at 81.
31. Luban, supra note 29, at 967.
32. Id. at 959-60.
33. Id. at 959-62.
34. Id.
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unfamiliar with Eve Sedgwick's literary criticism and who are about as in-
terested in Foucault as Foucault was in them.
35
C. Thesis: Willful Ignorance, Racism, and Unequal Protection
Having explained what I mean by willful ignorance, I can now offer a
more concrete description of my use of the concept here. In the mode of
critical race scholarship, which seeks "to understand how a regime of white
supremacy ... [has] been created and maintained in America and, in par-
ticular, to examine the relationship between that social structure and pro-
fessed ideals such as . . . equal protection,"36 I propose that willful
ignorance provides a way of accounting for equal protection's failure to
protect black Americans. Willful ignorance functions on two levels in cur-
rent equal protection law. The first level is doctrinal; the second is practi-
cal, and has to do with ignorance's political utility. On the level of
doctrine, this article focuses on the two defects identified earlier, intent and
colorblindness, and it explains how ignorance is indulged, employed, or im-
posed in each context.
In Part One, "Blissful Ignorance and the Unintentional Discrimina-
tor," I use Charles Lawrence's concept of "unconscious racism" to describe
how the Supreme Court's requirement of discriminatory intent privileges
and perpetuates discriminators' ignorance of their own racism. I character-
ize the choice of an intent requirement as a judicial deployment of what
Sedgwick calls "ignorance effects,"37 one that immunizes from constitu-
tional sanction the most widespread (and perhaps the most devastating)
forms of discrimination. I further argue that the requirement of discrimina-
tory purpose is premised upon a willful ignorance of history, in that the
conceptions of fault and causation implicit in any understanding of intent
are, in light of the history of black Americans, entirely out of place in the
determination of equal protection violations.
Part Two, "Judicial Ignorance and the Intentional Discriminator," de-
scribes how the Court's assertion of its own ignorance, its own inability to
know an actor's motive, has served as the basis upon which to erect such a
high bar for a showing of discriminatory intent that many instances of con-
sciously racist discrimination can withstand constitutional challenge.
In Part Three, "The Most Willful Blindness," I elaborate upon Derrick
Bell's contention that colorblindness has allowed the Court "to ignore his-
torical patterns, to ignore contemporary statistics, and to ignore flexible
reasoning. ''38 I argue that the doctrine is premised upon a tragic historical
amnesia and a profound blindness to modern reality - even when, as in the
recent case of Grutter v. Bollinger, an exception is made for limited race-
conscious decision-making. I emphasize that there is a reciprocal relation-
35. The threat of violence inherent in law was perhaps too obvious to greatly interest Fou-
cault, who was more concerned with subtler forms of coercion, the "humble modalities, [the]
minor procedures" of power. MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE
PRISON 170 (Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage Books 1977). As for the lawyers, I've been chided that
it's "the irrelevant part" of the academic legal community that bothers with Foucault.
36. Introduction, CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT
xiii (Kimberld Williams Crenshaw, Neil Gotanda, Gary Peller, & Kendall Thomas, eds., 1996).
37. SEDGWICK, supra note 2, at 5.
38. Derrick A. Bell, Racial Realism, 24 CONN. L. REV. 363, 369 (1992).
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ship between the Court's amnesiac understanding of history and the Amer-
ican people's; on one hand, the Justices reflect this national failing and, on
the other, they who are in a position to at least partially correct our error
perpetuate it instead.
In my conclusion, "A Web of Ignorances," I describe how willful igno-
rance may be characterized as the proverbial "tie that binds" the doctrines
of intent and colorblindness. I argue that the ignorance embodied in un-
conscious racism and constitutionalized by the intent doctrine - essentially
whites' ignorance of their own racial specificity - functions to bolster the
problematic notions of merit and neutrality that in turn reinforce color-
blindness and dominate the discourse of affirmative action. I then posit
that by creating an impossibly numerous class of innocent whites (innocent
by law, either because they had no intent to discriminate or because that
intent could not reach the court's cognition), the intent doctrine bolsters
the ignorance of history and reality that together rationalize
colorblindness.
Running parallel to my description of the centrality of ignorance to
each of the "doctrinal mystifications"39 outlined above is the hypothesis
that ignorance, aside from being a mere trend, is the very thing that permits
these doctrines to mystify. The harnessing and deployment of ignorance
effects functions today in much the same way that legal formalism allowed
the Lochner Court to mask from its readers and from the public - and even
to hide from itself - the deeply political character of its decisions. Igno-
rance, both ours and the Court's, camouflages a drastically retrograde race-
politics, allowing our constitutional doctrines to appear more moderate
than they are.4" Or to put it as Richard Delgado might, the "primary in-
strument" of racial subordination in this country is the prevailing mindset
"by means of which members of the dominant group justify the world as it
is."" My argument about the practical utility of willful ignorance is that it
is a prominent feature of the dominant and dominating mindset.
Why is ignorance so convenient, so compelling to the discriminator's
mindset? I think the explanation has something to do with its
"forgivability," a phenomenon that Sedgwick derides as "the... palpably
sentimental privileging of ignorance as an originary, passive innocence. "42
Even if criminal law occasionally accommodates a notion of guilty igno-
rance, society on the whole resists the idea. The equation of ignorance with
39. Introduction, supra note 36, at xxviii.
40. As Professor Anthony Cook suggested to me, ignorance may be what allows "compas-
sionate conservativism" to call itself (and maybe even see itself) as compassionate. Conversation
with Anthony Cook, Professor, Georgetown University Law Center, in Washington, D.C. (Feb.
2004).
41. Richard Delgado, Legal Storytelling: Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea
for Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2411, 2412 (1988).
42. SEDGWICK, supra note 2, at 7. Sedgwick's characterization of rape law is a remarkably
accurate description of the state of affairs in Great Britain. See Director of Pub. Prosecutions v.
Morgan, 1976 A.C. 182, 2 All E.R. 347, [1975] 2 W.L.R. 913 (H.L.) (where the House of Lords
ruled that an alleged rapist may not be convicted even when he unreasonably believes that his
alleged victim consented). In the United States, however, "most ... courts have omitted mens rea
altogether," and have instead - but to equally pernicious effects - turned the inquiry involved in a
rape trial almost totally toward the intent of the alleged victim. Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE
L.J. 1087, 1097-1101 (1986).
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innocence has deep roots in our culture. In the Gospel of Luke, Jesus
speaks heavenward of those who have crucified him, "Father, forgive them,
for they know not what they do."' 43 This biblical conflation of ignorance
and innocence was thoroughly secularized by 1548, when the English
chronicler Edward Hall wrote of "a man of no great wit, suche as men
comonly call an Innocent man." 4 4 Today, "ignorant" and "innocent" are
still understood as synonyms in certain contexts; one definition of "igno-
rant" in the Oxford English Dictionary is "[hlaving no knowledge of, hence
• . . innocent of," and one definition of "innocent" is "simplicity, hence,
want of knowledge, ignorance. ' 45 Both terms may denote a naivet6 most
closely associated with children,46 who are often protected from aspersions
of punishable guilt, but their legal metonymy can apply to even the most
adult offenses - note the "epistemological asymmetry" of rape law, which,
as Sedgwick provocatively charges, "privileges at the same time men and
ignorance, inasmuch as it matters not at all what the woman perceives or
wants so long as the man raping her can claim not to have noticed. '47 By
marrying our ignorance to innocence, we bargain our way out of facing
problems and treating them.
You may be wondering why a theory purporting to explain a body of
constitutional law that's deeply harmful to black Americans should be
based on anything other than flat-out racism. Part One's discussion of un-
conscious racism will suggest a partial answer to that necessary question,
but for the time being it should be conceded that, far from rejecting racism
as the reason for our judicially-enforced regime of unequal protection, I am
characterizing how racism functions at the Supreme Court and, recipro-
cally, in the general culture. Girardeau Spann's assessment that "when the
Court is called upon to protect minority interests, it ... [operates] as little
more than a covert agent of the majority"48 is reflected in the fact that the
ignorances deployed in constitutional equal protection doctrine correspond
to broader, cultural ignorances, whose main objects are black Americans
and American racism itself. These ignorances, I believe, replace a "posi-
tive" knowledge of racial superiority that has been partly purged from the
white mindset in the past half-century; they're like mental "gaps" that con-
tinue, in Sedgwick's words, to serve as "weighty and.., consequential epis-
temological place[s]" '49 from which racist impulses continue to emanate.50
43. Luke 23:34.
44. EDWARD HALL, THE UNION OF THE NOBLE AND ILUSTRE FAMELIES OF LANCASTRE
AND YORK (1548).
45. OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 18, at 640, 995.
46. As an adjective, "innocent" is defined as "having or showing the simplicity [or] ignorance
... of a child or one ignorant of the world." As a noun, "innocent" can itself mean "a young
child." Id., at 996.
47. SEDGWICK, supra note 2, at 5.
48. SPANN, supra note 21, at 19.
49. SEDGWICK, supra note 2, at 77.
50. To put the point more plainly, what racial knowledge was (and is) to targeted racism,
racial ignorance is to systemic or institutional racism. One example, to which we will return,
comes from the context of higher education. Generally speaking, universities no longer discrimi-
nate against racial minorities in a formal sense; in fact, they often use affirmative action to in-
crease minority enrollment. Affirmative action, however, is perceived as an exception to neutral
standards of merit, standards to which the universities will vigorously and proudly return once
affirmative action is "no longer necessary." But such a conception of merit, and thus of affirma-
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In light of the ignorance/racism double-whammy, I address this article
primarily to race-liberals and the legal community. First, by "race-liber-
als," I mean people who are nonracist in their rhetoric, self-perception, and
conscious intention. (I imagine that if you've read this far, you're probably
such a person.) However many pernicious equal protection opinions the
Justices might write, I think that - at least by the definition offered here -
they would all have to be identified as race-liberals. In this sense, I know
very few figures in the legal community whom I would not so identify,51
and I say this fully aware of the wide range of particular opinions on race
that issue from this profession's mainstream. Few liberals in the legal com-
munity, even self-designated liberals, would embrace the kinds of sweeping
doctrinal and social overhaul that many Critical Race Theorists have called
necessary for healing this country's racial wounds, an antagonism veiled by
ostensibly good intentions. As Stephen Steinberg observes, "[1]iberals are
not the enemy, [but] the 'enemy' depends on the so-called liberal to put a
kinder and gentler face on racism; to subdue the rage of the oppressed; to
raise false hopes that change is imminent; to modulate the demands for
complete liberation. '5 2 This description of the role of liberals in the per-
petuation of racial hierarchy corresponds precisely with my conception of
how ignorance functions in equal protection law - namely, as a cover.
I write, then, for those of us who have been, in the words of Anthony
Cook, "duped by the rhetoric of liberalism."53 While this article does not
answer Cook's call for work focusing on "constructive goals of social strug-
gle and practical strategies of mobilization,"54 I hope that my theory of
willful ignorance will show liberals and the legal community how they have
managed to ignore those tasks thus far and convince them why they must
do so no longer. Liberals abhor ignorance. Ignorance rebels against a
post-Enlightenment attitude, fundamental to liberal discourse, which un-
derstands truth-seeking as an ethical imperative. The legal community -
and not merely as a subset of liberals - also abhors ignorance. Shoshana
Felman perceptively calls law "a discipline of consciousness."55 True, jus-
tice should be blind, but only in the metaphorical sense of being unbiased;
in actuality, the study and practice of law are committed to insight. The
very vocabulary of a trial - "discovery," "voir dire," "eyewitness" - demon-
strates the extent to which law, like liberalism, is committed to truth-seek-
ing and truth-seeing. And it should be remembered that law, seemingly
alone in our culture, recognizes and punishes the phenomenon of willful
tive action, is largely contingent upon white's ignorance of their own race. (If you are incredulous
about whites' ignorance of their whiteness, see infra pp. 214-216) This ignorance allows whiteness
to masquerade as normal (in the normative sense) and white standards to pose as neutral and
nonracial.
51. This is a representation of "what has often been termed 'political correctness' inside and
outside the academy - a high level of righteousness, defensiveness, and concomitant refusal of the
very intellectual and political agonism that one expects to find celebrated in ... liberal thinking."
WENDY BROWN, POLITICS OUT OF HISTORY 37 (2001).
52. Stephen Steinberg, The Liberal Retreat from Race during the Post-Civil Rights Era, in
THE HouSE THAT RACE BUILT: BLACK AMERICANS, U.S. TERRAIN 13, 41 (Wahneema Lubiano
ed., 1997).
53. Anthony E. Cook, Beyond Critical Legal Studies: The Reconstructive Theology of Dr.
Martin Luther King, Jr., 103 HARV. L. REV. 985, 992 (1990).
54. Id.
55. FELMAN, supra note 1, at 107.
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ignorance. In law, and certainly in constitutional law, ignoranti non excusat
- ignorance is no excuse. The Supreme Court should know better and, in
some sense, it does.
I. BLISSFUL IGNORANCE AND THE UNINTENTIONAL DISCRIMINATOR
[A] court . . . is often inflicted with a particular judicial blindness that
unwittingly reflects and duplicates the constitutional blindness of culture.
... A pattern emerges in which the trial, while it tries to put an end to [a]
trauma, inadvertently performs an acting out of it.
Shoshana Felman, The Juridical Unconscious
56
Washington v. Davis was the decision that made intent to discriminate
an explicit requirement of equal protection violations.57 Decided in 1976,
more than twenty years after Brown, the situation at issue in Davis was
typical of the post-Brown era, in which many institutions remained segre-
gated, all-white, or nearly all-white even in the absence of formal racial
policies. The Davis plaintiffs were black applicants to the District of Co-
lumbia Metropolitan Police Department who were rejected because they
had not achieved a certain minimum score on a written test of verbal skills
"used generally throughout the federal service."" s They argued that be-
cause blacks consistently performed worse than whites on "Test 21," as it
was called, and because the exam had not been shown to correlate with
subsequent job performance, the burden was on the state to justify its hir-
ing practices. Their argument for what's known as an "effects test" makes
intuitive sense; stated simply, "your test disproportionately flunks black ap-
plicants, so prove its relevance to the job."
Justice White, writing for the majority, rejected the plaintiffs' pro-
posed equal protection analysis. The Court conceded that in Griggs v.
Duke Power Co. it had adopted an effects test for interpreting Title VII,59
but the Constitution? - now that was a different story. Ignoring the actual
argument before it (again, that a showing of discriminatory effect should
merely shift the burden of proof),60 the Court refused to embrace "the pro-
position that a law or other official act, without regard to whether it reflects
a racially discriminatory purpose, is unconstitutional solely because it has a
racially disproportionate impact."'61 Whether or not it was accurate to
characterize precedent on this point as determinative - the opinion's treat-
ment of "some indications to the contrary in our cases" is rather inge-
nious 62 - the Court insisted that "the invidious quality of a law claimed to
be racially discriminatory must ultimately be traced to a racially discrimina-
tory purpose. ' 63 Test 21 was not designed with an intent to keep blacks off
the police force, and therefore the plaintiffs, "as Negroes, could no more
successfully claim that the test denied them equal protection than could
56. FELMAN, supra note 1, at 5.
57. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
58. Id. at 234.
59. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
60. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 235 (1976).
61. Id. at 239 (emphasis in original).
62. Id. at 242-47.
63. Id. at 240.
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white applicants who also failed."' A contrary holding would open the
floodgates, for if the Constitution protected blacks from disparate treat-
ment resulting from neutral-but-unjustified standards, there would arise
"serious questions about ... a whole range of tax, welfare, public service,
regulatory, and licensing statutes."65 Imagine that.
Though there is much to criticize in Washington v. Davis,6 6 this section
is limited to a discussion of two willful ignorances at play in the Court's
choice of an intent standard. The first is the doctrine's implicit grounding
in formalistic notions of fault and causation, which make sense only if his-
tory should be ignored or forgotten in the adjudication of race-discrimina-
tion claims. Because this phenomenon is discussed at greater length in Part
Three, I focus more extensively here on the second ignorance-related prob-
lem - namely, how the intent requirement incites us to ignorance of our
own racist impulses and discriminatory behaviors.
A. Intent Doctrine and Willful Ignorance of History
Justice White's opinion in Davis manifests an astounding cultural am-
nesia that we will encounter again in the Court's colorblindness doctrine.
Willful blindness may be a more accurate description than amnesia, be-
cause it's difficult to believe that the Justices, like so many Americans, have
really forgotten this country's shameful racial history. Call it what you will,
this forgetfulness operates in the intent requirement via an implicit insis-
tence upon legal notions of fault and causation, in which every violation
must have its perpetrator. As Alan Freeman writes, "the causation princi-
ple makes it clear that some objective instances of discrimination are to be
regarded as mere accidents, or 'caused,' if at all, by the behavior of ances-
tral demons whose responsibility cannot follow their successors in interest
over time.""
Freeman's reference to "ancestral demons" and "successors in inter-
est" suggests the naive ahistoricism of the intent requirement. In Davis, for
example, the Court never asks why, in the absence of intent, blacks none-
theless scored less well than whites on Test 21. A full answer to this ques-
tion would be complicated, but it takes an utter disregard of 500 years of
racial subordination on this continent not to perceive that the discrepancies
in exam performance are, in large part, but one consequence of a disgrace-
ful racial history. Asking the rejected applicants to name a specific person
or group who harbored the necessary intent to discriminate erases history
from the picture, as if both the black applicant and the white police chief,
64. Id. at 246.
65. Id. at 248. I can't resist highlighting the fact that this consequentialist policy argument
(which essentially decides by fiat that serious questions may not be raised about this wide range
of statutes) reflects an important part of the liberal sensibility discussed earlier - namely, a com-
mitment to order and to progress that's no faster than slow-and-steady. As Martin Luther King
wrote in 1963, "I have almost reached the regrettable conclusion that the Negro's great stumbling
block in the stride toward freedom is not the White Citizens Counciler or the Ku Klux Klanner,
but the white moderate who is more devoted to 'order' than to justice." MARTIN LUTHER KING,
JR., Letter from a Birmingham Jail, in I HAVE A DREAM: WRITINGS AND SPEECHES THAT
CHANGED THE WORLD 83, 91, (James Melvin Washington, ed. 1986).
66. See, e.g., SPANN, supra note 21, at 36-41, 60-66; David Strauss, Discriminatory Intent and
the Taming of Brown, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 935 (1989).
67. Freeman, supra note 9, at 30.
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the applicant's father and the chief's father, and so on, had been equally
well-prepared to take this verbal exam (which, remember, may not have
had anything to do with actual job performance). The excuse that no one
in particular meant for things to turn out as they did is premised upon the
inarguable fact that no one in particular caused the discrepancies. And so,
paradoxically, it is the very history that is unaccounted for in the Court's
equal protection doctrine that will have to take the blame for the plaintiffs'
failure to perform better. The intent standard reflects what historian
Wendy Brown identifies as the contemporary tendency to "personify op-
pression in the figure of individuals and ... reify it in particular acts and
utterances." The doctrine manifests "a peculiar relationship to history, one
that holds history responsible, at the same time as it evinces a disbelief in
history as a teleological force [and] .. .disavow[s] history as .. .produc-
tive."68 History is conjured momentarily and no more than implicitly, so
that we can blame and perhaps even regret it, only to be forgotten - or,
better, ignored - at the critical moment of decision.
B. Intent Doctrine and the Privileging of Ignorance
Saint Jerome spoke of the double sin of being "ignorant of your igno-
rance."69 Sadly, through its intent doctrine, the Court commits precisely
this offense when it fails to take into account, and thereby privileges, un-
conscious racism - or the fact that most people, most discriminators, are
ignorant of their own biases, or are ignorant of the extent and depth (and,
thus, the fertility) of those biases. Unconscious racism works subtly on a
decision; there's certainly no intent to discriminate, even if invidious racial
discrimination is, in fact, what drives the ultimate course of action. Charles
Lawrence, who did much to acquaint the legal community with the concept
and prevalence of unconscious racism, illustrates the phenomenon by way
of a hypothetical scenario where an employer selects a white applicant
rather than a black one, sincerely believing that his decision is "based on
observed intangibles unrelated to race; [he] perceives the white candidate
as 'more articulate,' 'more collegial,' 'more thoughtful,' or 'more charis-
matic,' [and he] is unaware of the learned stereotype that influenced his
decision."7 ° Adrian Piper offers a more stunning example, one whose im-
plications for Lawrence's employment scenario run deep:
No reflective and well-intentioned white person ... wants to admit to
instinctively recoiling at the thought of being identified as black herself.
But if you want to see such a white person do this, just peer at the per-
son's facial features and tell her, in a complimentary tone of voice, that
she looks as though she might have some black ancestry, and watch her
reaction. It's not a test I or any black person finds.., pleasant to awply
... and having once done so inadvertently, I will never do it again.
68. BROWN, supra note 51, at 21, 30.
69. See CAROLINNE WHITE, THE CORRESPONDENCE (394-419) BETWEEN JEROME AND Au-
GUSTINE OF Hippo 394-419 (1990).
70. Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Uncon-
scious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 343 (1987).
71. Adrian Piper, Passing for White, Passing for Black, in CRITICAL WHITE STUDIES: LOOK-
ING BEHIND THE MIRROR 425, 428 (Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic eds., 1997).
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The evidence for unconscious racism isn't merely anecdotal. From the
theoretical standpoint of psychology, the field that gave us the concept of
the unconscious, this form of ignorance makes perfect sense. Lawrence
notes cognitive psychology's demonstration that transmission of our most
deeply entrenched cultural beliefs and preferences are, most of the time,
exactly those beliefs and preferences that "are not experienced as explicit
lessons."72 On this view, then, some of our racism must be unconscious,
given that so much of it is unconsciously transmitted. But this is only the
beginning.
Since the civil rights movement, Americans are decreasingly tolerant
of open expressions of bigotry. This change is more than just a dictate of
political correctness; it reflects an understanding among most whites that
racism, at least in the abstract, is wrong. Thus whites experience great so-
cial pressure (the threat of shame) and varying degrees of internal pressure
(the threat of guilt) to repress their racism, to ignore it as if that will make it
go away. The project isn't entirely fruitless; as Freud said of the repressed,
"it is true that they have driven [repression of the idea to which the intoler-
able wish is attached] out of consciousness and out of memory, [they] have
apparently saved themselves a large amount of unpleasure [sic]."173 So far
so good. "But" - and this is the important part for our consideration of
ignorance and intent- "the repressed wishful impulse continues to exist in
the unconscious," and there it sits, quasi-dormant, "on the look-out for an
opportunity of being activated. 74
Surely this is all quite familiar. We're well aware in this post-Freudian
age that the unconscious manifests itself constantly in our lives, although
naturally and necessarily we're not aware of giving it expression, especially
as we're acting on its urgings. So it shouldn't come as a surprise that ra-
cism, like any other taboo, doesn't evaporate altogether once we've
cleansed it from our conscious thoughts, and that we continue to act on
racist impulses submerged in the unconscious.
Nor does the evidence of unconscious racism stop at the level of the-
ory. The hypothesis that we are ignorant of our own racism has been borne
out in many empirical studies, too numerous to summarize here.75 The
same studies which attest to white Americans' embrace of principles of ra-
cial equality also document important discrepancies between that nominal
commitment and persisting forms of racial bias. If most whites say they
aren't racist, there are only two ways of squaring their self-description with
their well-documented racist behaviors, discussed below and throughout
this article: either they're lying or they're unconsciously discriminating.
There's no need to choose between the two possibilities; one is true for
some people, the second is true for others, and both are true for most of us.
72. Lawrence, supra note 70, at 323.
73. SIGMUND FREUD, FIVE LECTURES ON PSYCHO-ANALYsIs 26 (James Strachey trans.,
W.W. Norton & Company, 1977) (1909).
74. Id. (emphasis in original).
75. For summaries of some of these studies, see David B. Oppenheimer, Negligent Discrimi-
nation, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 899 (1993); Eleanor Marie Brown, Note, The Tower of Babel: Bridging
the Divide Between Critical Race Theory and "Mainstream" Civil Rights Scholarship, 105 YALE
L.J. 513, 523-29 (1995).
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A good example of unconscious racism exposed by sociological re-
search is the study measuring the impact of racial stereotyping on percep-
tion by asking white college students to view a scene in which one person
shoved another. When the aggressor was black, white students called the
shove "violent"; when the aggressor was white, they described it as "play-
ing around."76 Or take Faye Crosby's revealing "helping studies." In one,
someone posing as a supermarket shopper would drop a bag of groceries
and white shoppers were observed for differences in behavior depending
on whether the person was white or black. Another study measured
whether whites were less likely to help blacks than whites when called by
someone posing as a motorist in distress. Having conducted thirty experi-
ments of this sort, Crosby found that white subjects showed discriminatory
behavior against blacks in 40% of the scenarios. This figure, however, is
conservative if one factors in the nature and extent of the help that whites
offered blacks compared to whites.77
Given whites' purported self-conceptions, 78 most of these studies' sub-
jects would not have predicted their discriminatory responses. Again, this
discrepancy between what people say and what they do means they're ei-
ther lying or are "just" unaware of their racist tendencies. To the extent
the latter is true, an intent standard under the Equal Protection Clause is
manifestly underinclusive. Unfortunately, as one commentator dryly ob-
serves, the Court "did not consult sociological or psychological studies of
racial bias" when deciding the cases that established and then elaborated
the requirement of purposeful discrimination. 79 Today, Justice Stevens
comes close in his occasional reference to "blind habit" and "automatic
reflex,"'80 but of the Justices sitting on the current Court, it is Justice Gins-
burg who most consistently voices an awareness of this definitionally unde-
tected form of racism. Dissenting from Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,
Justice Ginsburg wrote that "bias, both conscious and unconscious, reflect-
ing traditional and unexamined habits of thought, keeps up barriers that
must come down if equal opportunity and nondiscrimination are ever gen-
uinely to become this country's law and practice."'81 In Grutter v. Bollinger
she emphasized that "[i]t is well documented that conscious and uncon-
scious race bias, even rank discrimination based on race, remain alive in
our land." 82
In light of her consciousness of unconscious racism, does Justice Gins-
burg, like Lawrence, fear that "[e]ven the most thorough investigation of
conscious motive will not uncover the race-based stereotype that has influ-
76. Faye Crosby et al., Recent Unobtrusive Studies of Black and White Discrimination and
Prejudice: A Literature Review, 87 PSYCHOL. BULL. 546, 556 (1980).Oppenheimer, supra note 75,
at 914.
77. Id at 549. For example, in the grocery bag experiment, the help offered to white women
was usually thorough and time-consuming (subjects would help pick up all the groceries), while
the help offered to black women was more likely to be gestural (subjects would pick up, say, a
few vegetables).
78. Oppenheimer, supra note 75, at 904-911.
79. Siegel, supra note 10, at 1136.
80. See, e.g., Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 318 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 222-23 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment).
81. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 274 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
82. Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S.Ct. 2325, 2348 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
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enced [a] decision?" 3 The intent standard's inadequacy in this regard was
dramatic in the case of Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous-
ing Corp., where the Supreme Court ruled that a mostly white suburb's
refusal to grant a rezoning request to develop multifamily, low-income
housing did not violate equal protection. 84 The Court conceded that the
town's decision had racially discriminatory effects, but it did not find the
purposeful discrimination necessary to establish a winning claim. As Law-
rence speculates, however, unconscious racism might have informed the
permit's denial in any number of scenarios.85 Perhaps "[a] constituency
within Arlington Heights - [say the] elderly ... did not actively campaign
for the rezoning," despite its interest in low-income housing, because of a
[partly] unconscious aversion to blacks prevented coalition?86 Or maybe
the interests of black people were completely ignored; "i.e., it was a fight
between environmentalists and developer[s], but an inadvertent devaluing
of black interests caused inattention to the costs blacks would have to bear
• . . [Such] selective indifference or misapprehension of costs .. .occurs
entirely outside of consciousness."87
The other side of the unconscious racism coin is the phenomenon that
Barbara Flagg's powerful book, Was Blind But Now I See, calls "white
transparency," or "the tendency of whites not to think about whiteness," to
rarely understand or describe themselves in racial terms.88 This ignorance
is one of "the most striking characteristic[s]" of white racism, because
whites' relegation of their own racial specificity "to the realm of the sub-
conscious" is contingent upon a dominant place in the American racial
hierarchy:89
Do you attribute your successes or failures in life to your whiteness?
What about the life courses of others? .. .[H]ow much attention did
[Justice Souter's] race receive in conversations among whites about his
abilities and prospects for confirmation? Did you or your white acquaint-
ances speculate on the ways his whiteness might have contributed to his
success, how his race may have affected his character and personality, or
how his whiteness might predispose him to a racially skewed perspective
on legal issues? 9°
To put it mildly, the phenomenon of white transparency calls into
question even the most innocent-looking decisions, because requirements
that whites perceive as neutral will very likely reflect distinctly white stan-
dards, and procedures that whites perceive as neutral will very likely be
infused with - let's call it white obliviousness. In a defense of affirmative
action policies as checks on institutional forms of racism, Robin Barnes
83. Lawrence, supra note 70, at 343.
84. Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Housing Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
85. Of course, the key word here is speculated. The problem with shifting the burden of proof
to the defendant only after intent has been established is that, although we can't know in advance
if unconscious racism was the force driving a decision, an effects test would presumably force the
defendant to show that the contested decision was the result of other, legitimate motives. As
things operate currently, our speculations of unconscious racism remain as potent before a case
has been brought as after it's been dismissed for want of purposeful discrimination.
86. Lawrence, supra note 70, at 348-9.
87. Id. at 349.
88. BARBARA FLAGG, WAS BLIND BUT Now I SEE 1 (1998).
89. Id. at 2.
90. Id. at 3.
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describes how white transparency can figure into the work of, say, the hir-
ing committee at a high-ranking law school:
Three white male members of the ... committee, all good liberals, had a
white male friend [whom] they honestly believed would have filled [a va-
cant] position well. No doubt he would have. But... the women [who
sat on the committee] insisted [upon holding] the position open for a
while to consider women and persons of color.... While these white male
faculty members were guilty of no malice, what almost occurred would
have been totally exclusionary, regardless of motive or intent.91
The problem here, constitutionally speaking, isn't the hiring committee's
lack of concern for faculty diversity; the averted exclusion is questionable
because, by looking only to their own cronies, the white male professors
immediately and arbitrarily narrowed the pool of contenders to one that's
even more white and male than the applicant pool generally.
Washington v. Davis, which established the requirement of purposeful
discrimination, may have been - indeed, looks very much like - an instance
of white transparency at work. Remember that the purportedly neutral
Test 21 (1) was not shown to have anything to do with actual job perform-
ance and (2) black applicants flunked at a much higher rate than white
applicants. Assuming, as the record seemed to suggest, that the test did not
correlate with success on the job, isn't "neutral" a strange word to describe
the standards set by Test 21? Mightn't "white" be a better word to describe
them?92
From its very origins, then, the intent doctrine has failed "to provide
any foothold for attacking the transparency phenomenon,"93 which is,
again, one manifestation of whites' ignorance of their own racism. Ac-
knowledgement of this ignorance by the Supreme Court would mandate a
necessary skepticism of all facially neutral criteria of decision making, one
that would regard all such criteria as presumptively white-specific.94 In-
stead, by ignoring the reality of unconscious racism, the intent requirement
mandates the exact opposite - namely, an unwarranted presumption of
race-neutrality.
Arlington Heights and Davis illustrate how unconscious racism may be
at play in decisions which, using an intent standard, will not be deemed
unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause. As such, these cases
show that the Court was wrong to insist that a showing of discriminatory
effects should not shift the burden of proof. For if we are ignorant of our
motives, and if those motives can be guilty ones - a possibility recognized
from ancient Greek tragedy to twentieth-century psychoanalysis95 - then
91. Robin D. Barnes, Politics and Passion: Theoretically a Dangerous Liaison, 101 YALE L.J.
1631, 1653 (1992).
92. There is, of course, no contradiction between, on one hand, the proposition that past and
present discrimination partly explain why blacks have not learned a certain set of skills as well as
whites, and, on the other hand, the proposition that those skills reflect a specifically racial knowl-
edge. Both explanations tell a different part of the same story. To tell it again briefly: a dominant
group establishes a particular regime of truth, internalizes it as the natural order of things, and in
manifold ways keeps a subordinated group from even participating in that already inhospitable
regime.
93. FLAGG, supra note 88, at 10.
94. Id. at 4, 53-65.
95. Albert Ehrenzweig writes:
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the intent doctrine established in Davis, requiring (at least) that the defen-
dant be conscious of her unfair treatment of black people, calculated or
not, "severely limits the number of individual cases in which the courts will
acknowledge and remedy racial discrimination." 96 As Lawrence writes, if
equal protection jurisprudence necessitates "the elimination of governmen-
tal decisions that take race into account without good and important rea-
sons," '97 then the law of equal protection must deal with the profundity of
Americans' ignorance of their own racism.
Here we reach the most egregious aspect of the intent doctrine: the
Court's outright validation, perpetuation, and imposition of American ig-
norance. The judge-made rule that only conscious discriminatory purpose
violates equal protection gives us, all of us, an incentive not to confront or
counteract our unconscious racism. Willful ignorance is defined, in part, by
the investment its bearer has in it; clearly, avoiding judicial sanction for
racial discrimination makes one's investment in ignorance even stronger
than it already is (i.e., as a means of evading others' disdain and one's own
feeling of guilt). By keeping us ignorant - by insisting, in Lawrence's
words, "that we participate in [a] fantasy"98 - the Court appears to be do-
ing us the favor of keeping us innocent. As we'll soon see, this favor comes
at great cost. Not only is our innocence a fiction, it's a fiction that rears its
head again in the colorblindness doctrine, where, bolstered by its affirma-
tion in the intent doctrine, it wreaks still more damage to the constitutional
mandate of equal protection of the laws.
II. JUDICIAL IGNORANCE AND THE INTENTIONAL DISCRIMINATOR
Blind and naked Ignorance
Delivers brawling judgments, unashamed...
Alfred Lord Tennyson, Idylls of the King99
It has been argued that a discriminatory purpose standard per se need
not pose any problem for minority interests. Girardeau Spann notes that
"the concept of intent can mean [conscious] purpose, or it can mean tolera-
tion of known effects, or it can mean knowing toleration of ignorance
about likely effects."1 ° As this definitional spectrum indicates, sometimes
there's but a fine line separating an intent test from an effects test. Inter-
estingly, it was with this knowledge that Justice Stevens joined the majority
in Washington v. Davis. "Frequently," he wrote, "the most probative evi-
Could it not be that man . . .projects into his aggressor a guilty conscience which is
related to his Oedipal urge and its repression? Could it not be that it is this repression of
subconscious guilt that makes us disbelieve our fellow man's claim to innocence? Oedi-
pus' incest appeared innocent. Yet Sophocles' audience thought Oedipus' blinding just.
It may be claimed that this was due to early conscious acceptance of a predestination of
both crime and punishment. But is it not easier to assume an unconscious presumption
of guilt, which justified the offender's punishment? As Freud said, feeling of Oedipal
guilt can exist even where 'the violation occurs unwittingly.'
ALBERT A. EHRENZWEIG, PSYCHOANALYTIC JURISPRUDENCE: ON ETHICS, AESTHETICS, AND
"LAw" 227 (1971).
96. Lawrence, supra note 70, at 324.
97. Id. at 323.
98. Id at 325.
99. Alfred Lord Tennyson, Idylls of the King (1950), "Merlin and Vivien" 1:662.
100. SPANN, supra note 21, at 62.
NATIONAL BLACK LAW JOURNAL 257
dence of intent will be objective evidence of what actually happened rather
than evidence describing the subjective state of mind of the actor. For nor-
mally the actor is presumed to have intended the natural consequences of
his deeds."'' 1
Thinking along with Justice Stevens, David Strauss suggested a "re-
versing the groups" test to implement the intent requirement, where a
court would ask whether a governmental decision would have been differ-
ent had the adverse effects fallen on whites rather than blacks. 10 2 This test
articulates a standard that remains true to the spirit of the Equal Protection
Clause and, as Strauss pointed out, resonates with our common under-
standings of discrimination (i.e., "You wouldn't have rejected that appli-
cant if he had been white."). 1 3 Moreover, and most importantly in light of
the critique of ignorance elaborated in Part One, a "reversing the groups
test" would reach both conscious and unconscious discrimination. 10 4
The Court has not embraced a "reversing the groups" test and has
actually gone far in the opposite direction, making the standards for estab-
lishing discriminatory purpose more stringent than might have been pre-
dicted from the standpoint of Davis. In Arlington Heights, the Court set
forth high evidentiary requirements focusing on factors like the particular
sequence of events leading up to the challenged practice or decision, devia-
tions from standard decision-making procedures, and departures from sub-
stantive factors normally taken into account. "Without purporting to be
exhaustive," these were, said Justice Powell, the "subjects of proper inquiry
in determining whether racially discriminatory intent existed. 10 5 As Kath-
leen Sullivan writes, the Arlington Heights decision "made clear that prov-
ing [an unconstitutional motivation] would not be easy."106
In Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, a 1980 gender-
discrimination case upholding a Massachusetts law that granted a state-em-
ployment preference to the overwhelmingly male population of military
veterans, the Court maintained, and on some readings raised, the high bar
for discriminatory intent articulated in Arlington Heights. Although Mas-
sachusetts legislators must have been aware that this law would seriously
hinder female participation in the upper levels of civil service employment,
the Court held that this fact alone was inadequate to establish unconstitu-
101. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 253 (1976). Here Justice Stevens cited to Gomillion v.
Lightfoot, where the Court held that a local act altering the shape of a city from a square to a 28-
sided figure, with the effect of removing from the city of all but four or five of its 400 black voters
while not removing a single white voter, could be the basis of a valid equal protection claim. "The
conclusion would be irresistible, tantamount for all practical purposes to a mathematical demon-
stration, that the legislation is solely concerned with segregating white and colored voters by
fencing Negro citizens out of town so as to deprive them of their pre-existing municipal vote." 364
U.S. 339, 341 (1960).
102. Strauss, supra note 66, at 956; see also SPANN, supra note 21, at 62 ("a properly adminis-
tered intent principle would require strict scrutiny of all legislation having a racially disparate
impact, because mere legislative toleration of disparate impact can amount to ... intentional
discrimination.").
103. Strauss, supra note 66, at 958.
104. Id at 960. The test recommended by Strauss "asks what the decision maker would have
done in different circumstances. It does not matter whether the decision maker was aware that he
would have acted differently had he been dealing with people of a different race or sex."
105. Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Housing Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 565 (1977).
106. KATHLEEN SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 772 (14th ed. 2001).
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tional intent: "discriminatory purpose ... implies more than intent as voli-
tion or . . awareness of consequences. It implies that the decisionmaker
... selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part 'be-
cause of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects upon an identifiable
group."1 7 With more easily identifiable states of mind like volition explic-
itly rejected as adequate measures of intent, the current Court asks plain-
tiffs in equal protection suits to prove that governmental decision makers
acted with the express purpose of injuring them based on their minority
status - essentially "a legislative state of mind akin to malice."1 8
What's interesting about all this, so far as this article is concerned, is
how the Court arrives at such high intent standards. Palmer v. Thompson,
which actually pre-dated Davis, is telling in this regard. Palmer involved an
equal protection challenge to the decision of Jackson, Mississippi to close
its swimming pools shortly after they had been ordered desegregated.10 9
The city justified the pool closings on the ground that they "could not be
operated safely and economically on an integrated basis."11 The Court
accepted the city's reason and found no violation, despite significant evi-
dence to the contrary and despite the general, massive resistance through-
out the South to judicially mandated integration. It may seem amazing that
the Court took the city at its word in this case, but it did so, explained
Justice Black, because "it is extremely difficult for a court to ascertain the
motivation, or collection of different motivations, that lie behind a legisla-
tive enactment." ' Thus the Court can justify its high standards for a find-
ing of invidious intent through a profession of its own ignorance, its own
inability to know individuals' subjective intentions.
Justice Thomas wrote in Hunt v. Cromartie that "the task of assessing
... motivation.., is not a simple matter; on the contrary, it is an inherently
complex endeavor."112 But even in the face of such difficulties, the Court
is unwilling to sanction the sort of probing inquiry that might, in some
cases, actually discover an actor's motivations. "Administrative and legis-
lative history may be highly relevant," noted Justice Powell in Arlington
Heights, but "judicial inquiries into legislative or executive motivation re-
present a'substantial intrusion into the workings of other branches of gov-
ernment. Placing a decisionmaker on the stand is therefore . . . to be
avoided.""' 3
We're left with an intent standard that is, as Lawrence writes, "a mo-
tive-centered doctrine of racial discrimination [that] places a very heavy,
and often impossible, burden of persuasion on the wrong side of the dis-
pute.""' 4 Why is the burden "heavy and often impossible"? The answer,
says Lawrence, is remarkably straightforward: "Improper motives are easy
to hide." '15 Where the original choice of an intent requirement privileges
107. Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1980).
108. Siegel, supra note 10, at 1135.
109. Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971).
110. Id. at 225.
111. Id. at 224.
112. Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 546 (1999).
113. Viii. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Housing Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 268 n.18 (1977).
114. Lawrence, supra note 70, at 319.
115. Id.
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the unintentional discriminator, who is unconsciously racist, the extremely
high intent standards privilege the intentional discriminator, who is quite
consciously racist. Just as the choice of an intent standard creates an incen-
tive for some discriminators to remain ignorant of their racism, the Court's
profession of its own ignorance creates an incentive for other discrimina-
tors to hide the consciously racist grounds for their decision-making. When
an alternative standard like volition exists as a legitimate measure of the
judicially mandated intent requirement, the Court's admission of its igno-
rance and the standards that result from that admission must be under-
stood for what they are: a license to lie." 6
First it should be noted that discriminators do lie - and, more specifi-
cally, that white Americans lie quite frequently about their attitudes about
and behaviors toward black Americans. In interracial contexts, many
whites "avoid acting in [ways] they feel to be blatantly racist,""' and many
would probably agree (even sympathize with) the statement that "a lot of
whites still ... say the right [things] at the right times, but behind closed
doors or with their friends . . . they will be extremely bigoted." '118 This
distinction between "frontstage and backstage" actions was drawn decades
ago in sociologist Erving Goffman's classic research into prejudice and
stigma," 9 and it has been subsequently confirmed by numerous research-
ers. While most surveys show significant, but also significantly declining,
racist attitudes among whites, 2 ° these results are dubious because respon-
dents very often lie in order to spare themselves the embarrassment of be-
ing considered racist, even in otherwise confidential testing situations. This
dishonest tendency has been documented, for example, by a series of ex-
periments in which white subjects were asked for their views on black
Americans, with 50% of the participants hooked up to what they believed
was a lie-detector device. Not surprisingly, the whites who thought they
were being monitored for truthfulness admitted to far more racist attitudes
than those who did not.12 ' A similar study showed that white subjects who
had taken a written test measuring their perceptions of blacks gave much
harsher answers (meaning they told the truth more often) when answering
the same questions orally, hooked up to the phony lie-detector. 122
To what extent are findings of whites' propensity to lie about racist
impulses, beliefs, and motivations transposable to the contexts of legisla-
tion and other state decision-making? I think there's good reason to sus-
pect that conscious but well-hidden racism remains a basis for some
116. "Legislators do not make a practice of justifying legislation on the grounds that it will
adversely affect groups that have historically been subject to discrimination. To the contrary,
doctrines of heightened scrutiny have created incentives for legislators to explain their policy
choices in terms that cannot be so impugned." Siegel, supra note 10, at 1135-36 (emphasis added).
117. FEAGIN et al., WHITE RACISM: THE BASICS 186 (2001).
118. Id. at 195.
119. ERVING GOFFMAN, PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE (1959); ERVING
GOFFMAN, FRAME ANALYSIS: AN ESSAY ON THE ORGANIZATION OF EXPERIENCE (1974).
120. See generally, Oppenheimer, supra note 75.
121. Harold Sigall & Richard Page, Current Stereotypes: A Little Fading, A Little Faking, 18 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 247, 250-54 (1971); Charles S. Carver et al., Favorable Evalua-
tions of Blacks and the Handicapped: Positive Prejudice, Unconscious Denial, or Social Desirabil-
ity?, 8 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 97, 99 (1978).
122. Bem P. Allen, Social Distance and Admiration Reactions of "Unprejudiced" Whites, 43 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 709, 717-23 (1975).
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contemporary policy choices. Why should we imagine that lawmakers and
law enforcers - think here of, say, the Los Angeles Police Department -
are significantly more enlightened on racial issues than the populations
they serve? Spann effectively argues that the Supreme Court has proven
itself a highly majoritarian institution, reflecting the logic and prejudices of
the American mainstream. This correlation is likely to be even stronger for
elected representatives and low-level state actors. Political actors are sim-
ply more likely than most Americans to keep their racism hidden, given
that they are public figures who must pay particular attention to what
passes their lips.
Sometimes, though, politicians and officials slip and say something
that betrays profoundly racist sentiment. My guess - and I don't think it's
a stretch - is that such blunders normally reflect consciously and deeply
held beliefs, ones that are probably shared by any number of other state
actors and are sometimes central to those actors' decision-making. As
Michael Brown and colleagues write, "putative nonracists" often sound and
act like racists. They cite Trent Lott - the former Senate majority leader -
as one politician who lets his conscious racism out of the closet with auda-
cious frequency:
Until recently, [Lott was] closely associated with the Council of Con-
servative Citizens, a right-wing, prowhite political group. Before the
Washington Post exposed this group's racist views, Lott told its members,
"The people in this room stand for the right principles and the right phi-
losophy." This was not the first nor the last time Lott . . . blurred the
distinction between conservativism and not-so-subtle racist appeals....
[A] later statement cost him his position as Senate majority leader. "I
want to say this about my state," Lott said, at a celebration of Senator
Strom Thurmond's one hundredth birthday .... "[When Thurmond] ran
for president we voted for him. We're proud of it. And if the rest of the
country had followed our lead we wouldn't have had all these problems
over all these years, either. ' 121
Now, Thurmond "left little to the imagination" in his 1948 campaign
against Truman: "On the question of social intermingling of the races," he
declared, "we draw the line. And all the laws of Washington and all the
bayonets of the Army cannot force the Negro into our homes, into our
schools, our churches and our places of recreation and amusement. '124
Or take John Ashcroft, former United States Attorney General, who
defended the Confederacy in the pages of the Southern Partisan, which is
touted as "the oldest and the leading neo-Confederate publication. '125
House Majority Leader Dick Armey and Senators Thad Cochran, Phil
Gramm, Jesse Helms, and, of course, Trent Lott, have also contributed to
the Southern Partisan. Or take Montana Senator Conrad Burns, who re-
sponded to the question, "How can you live back there [in Washington,
D.C.] with all those niggers?" with "[It's] a hell of a challenge.' 1 26 So when
Senator Burns votes with Senators Cochran, Gramm, Helms, and Lott to
123. MICHAEL K. BROWN ET AL., WHITEWASHING RACE: THE MvT OF A COLOR-BLIND SO-
CIETY 54 (2003).
124. Id.
125. A review of the Southern Partisan, at http://www.templeofdemocracy.com/SouthernPar-
tisan.htm (last visited March 15, 2004).
126. BROWN ET AL., supra note 123, at 54.
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abolish a program that helps businesses owned by minorities to compete
for federally funded transportation, or when he votes against a minority
set-aside program for federal construction contracts, or when he votes
against a law that would enable prisoners appealing death penalty
sentences to argue racial discrimination on the basis of often-ghastly sen-
tencing statistics, isn't the conclusion irresistible, in light of his statement
on the difficulty of living in a city populated by "niggers," that some con-
scious racism is at play in those decisions?
I would tell anyone who's incredulous about an active desire among
state actors to harm black people and other racial minorities (and I have
spoken to a number of such individuals) that he's giving our elected and
non-elected officials more credit than they deserve. I do think malice - of
precisely the kind the Court has said constitutes intent for equal protection
purposes - is alive and well in American government. The problem, again,
is that it's hard to see. Our understandable ignorance of what happens
behind closed doors and in closed minds allows consciously racist motives
to go undetected when laws, actions, and policies are given reasonable-
sounding justifications that have nothing to do with race.12 7
Words like "fair play" provide a useful and often credible cover for
consciously racist ends. The problematic reality that "governmental offi-
cials will always be able to argue that racially neutral considerations
prompted" an action is exacerbated by the fact that most state decisions are
reached by multiple participants and are the result of "the interaction of amultitude of motives. '  The Court's malice-like definition of intent al-
lows legislatures to enact racist laws and policies so long as their racist
motivations are masked just enough to take advantage of the Court's blind-
ness to subjective states of mind. Unless a malicious intent to discriminate
is evident in the law itself (which is extremely rare) or is explicit in the
legislative history (also extremely rare), purposeful discriminators will
profit from the Court's ignorance. And in the extraordinary situation
where a governmental decision can be traced to such motives and is there-
fore struck down, there remains under the Court's current intent doctrine
the possibility of making the same decision again while pointing to new,
constitutionally legitimate aims.'29
I have already cited Palmer, the Mvississippi swimming-pool case, as an
example of how judicial ignorance functions as a boon to what look like
very purposeful discriminators. Lawrence posits that Arlington Heights -
which unlike Palmer was decided after Davis's explicit enunciation of an
intent requirement - might also be seen in this light. In Lawrence's ac-
count, the defendants might have claimed that they refused the zoning per-
mit for low-income housing in order to keep property values up, but their
127. Id at 55. " ... One cannot assume, as all too many ... do, that opposition to affirmative
action is based entirely on the principles of fair play and individual merit. Much of the opposition
is based on resentment toward blacks."
128. Lawrence, supra note 70, at 319.
129. Justice Black predicted this very possibility in Palmer v. Thompson: "[tihere is an ele-
ment of futility in a judicial attempt to invalidate a law because of the bad motives of its support-
ers, [because] if the law is struck down for this reason... it would presumably be valid as soon as
the legislature or relevant governing body repassed it for different reasons." 403 U.S. 217, 225
(1971).
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fear about property values was not based merely on the introduction of
poor people into their neighborhoods, but on the introduction of poor
black people into their neighborhoods. Lawrence argues that such a scena-
rio, where a city seeks to achieve an otherwise legitimate economic purpose
by excluding black people, as such, is the analytical equivalent of a differ-
ent scenario where there is "a classification by race on the face of the stat-
ute for which a legitimate goal is claimed."13 However, the high
evidentiary requirements for intent practically ensure that even a decision
whose justification is only once-removed from racist motivation will meet
the required standard.
The Court's profession of ignorance of subjective mental states is, I
suppose, a generally accurate assessment of its own real limitations. It's
not the confession of blindness that is troubling, but the malice-as-intent
standard - or, still more fundamentally, the intent standard itself - that
forces the Court to make the confession in the first place. Nonetheless, it
seems that in certain particularly egregious decisions, the Court's blindness
is powerfully willful, assiduously self-imposed. McCleskey v. Kemp may be
the paradigmatic case where the Court's purported inability to know
reaches nearly unbelievable proportions. McCleskey involved a statistical
study, undisputed so far as the Supreme Court was concerned, indicating
that murder convicts in Georgia were 4.3 times more likely to receive the
death penalty if their victims were white than if their victims were black,
and that black convicts were 1.1 times more likely to be sentenced to death
than white convicts.' The inevitable conclusion to be drawn from these
data was, as Spann writes, that the Georgia jury, "like the population at
large,... undervalues the lives of blacks to such an extent that it makes the
deterrent and retributive protection of the criminal law four times more
available to white citizens than it does to black citizens.' 1 32
Justice Powell's majority opinion in McCleskey is paean to the jury
system and the wide latitude for discretion that juries are traditionally al-
lowed. (To be fair, it's likely that juries' racially disproportionate applica-
tion of the death penalty resulted more from unconscious than conscious
racism, which would automatically disqualify it under Davis from consider-
ation as an equal protection violation.) The Powell opinion in McCleskey
also inquires into the motives of the Georgia legislature, asking whether
the state's death penalty statute was adopted in order to kill black people
specifically. Not surprisingly, the Court found no such intention.
Given the difficulties of pinning the equal protection violation on ei-
ther juries or lawmakers, Justice Marshall's dissent focuses on the role of
state prosecutors, who decide whether or not to seek the death penalty.
The study at issue found that prosecutors sought the death penalty in 70%
of the cases involving black defendants and white victims; 32% of the cases
involving white defendants and white victims; 15% of the cases involving
black defendants and black victims; and 19% of the cases involving white
130. Lawrence, supra note 70, at 348.
131. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 287 (1987).
132. SPANN, supra note 21, at 30. The Court characterized the findings differently: "At most,
the . . . Baldus study indicates a discrepancy that appears to correlate with race." Id. at 312.
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defendants and black victims. 133 Justice Marshall emphasized that the
plaintiff handily "established that the race of the victim is an especially
significant factor at the point where the defendant has been convicted of
murder and the prosecutor must choose whether to proceed to the penalty
phase of the trial and create the possibility that a death sentence may be
imposed or to accept the imposition of a sentence of life imprisonment."'
1 34
Marshall also alluded to the testimony of a representative from the Geor-
gia prosecutor's office, who listed "the likelihood that a jury would impose
the death sentence" among the factors taken into account in deciding
whether to seek that severest penalty. 135 These authoritative pieces of evi-
dence are, says Marshall, "ignored by the Court.' 36 Justice Brennan's dis-
sent lamented, in a similar vein, that "the considerations ... the majority
invokes to discount [the] evidence cannot justify ignoring its force,"'1 37 and
Justice Blackmun protested that "McCleskey's evidence confronts us with
the subtle and persistent influence of the past,... [and] we ignore him at
our peril."'1 38
Justice Powell and the four who joined his opinion claimed that the
answer to whether purposeful discrimination entered the deliberations
leading to McCleskey's death sentence was "unknown and perhaps un-
knowable."' 39 The dissenters respond that if the Court can't know in this
case, the Court mustn't be able to know anything.
III. THE MOST WILLFUL BLINDNESS
History in [Walter] Benjamin's reflections is related not just to the struc-
ture of a trial but, more radically, to "Judgment Day": the day on which
historical injustice will be canceled out precisely through the act of judg-
ment; the day on which justice and memory will coincide (perhaps the
day on which the court will be redeemed from its inherent politicalforgetfulness). Shoshana Felman, The Juridical Unconscious140
A colorblind Constitution is understood by the current Court to man-
date the strictest scrutiny of all racial classifications, regardless of whether
they are intended to benefit or disadvantage minorities. Controversy over
this interpretation is most audible in the affirmative action debate, where
proponents of the practice insist that the guarantee of equal protection
should not render presumptively invalid color-conscious measures that the
majority imposes upon itself. Under one common interpretation of the
Fourteenth Amendment, classifications based upon criteria like race are
presumptively unconstitutional because minorities require special protec-
tion against otherwise unbridled legislative majorities with whom coalition
133. It is remarkable, and notable for our discussion of willful blindness, that these statistics
were recited in the majority opinion, as well as the dissenting opinion of Justice Marshall. Mc-
Cleskey v. Kemp,481 U.S. 279, 287 (1987).
134. Id. at 355.
135. Id. at 358.
136. Id. at 351 (emphasis added).
137. Id. at 322 (emphasis added).
138. Id. at 344 (emphasis added).
139. Id. at 311, citing Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 503 (1972).
140. FELMAN, supra note 1, at 14.
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is unduly hindered by irrational prejudice.14 ' Strict scrutiny in such cases is
intended to correct a process defect that simply does not exist when, for
example, a predominantly white State Board of Regents, acting as the rep-
resentatives of a predominantly white population, imposes an affirmative
action program in the universities it runs.
As we saw earlier, the play of ignorances in intent doctrine is stunning
and complex, and always to the disadvantage of blacks. The presence and
function of ignorance in colorblindness doctrine is more straightforward.
Nonetheless, some readers might find counterintuitive the notion that col-
orblindness constitutes (or, more accurately, is constituted by) ignorance.
As Gary Peller has shown, the dominant liberal vision of American race
politics equates color-consciousness with racism, and both color-conscious-
ness and racism are equated with ignorance. 142 Peller writes that the "inte-
grationist ideology" implicit in Brown and subsequently championed by
race-liberals fighting the segregationist ideology of conservatives "identi-
fies progress with the transcendence of ... racial consciousness.' 1 43 The
progress narrative of liberal race ideology moves "from an ignorant time
when racial status was taken to signify real and meaningful differences be-
tween people, to the present, enlightened time, when race properly is un-
derstood ... not to make a difference except as [a vestige] of unfortunate
historical oppression."'14 4 Peller identifies liberal notions of prejudice, dis-
crimination, and segregation as embodiments of "the central aspect of ra-
cism - the distortion of reason through the prism of myth and
ignorance.' 45 Naturally, then, "knowledge" derived from interracial inter-
actions is understood within this paradigm as the opposite of "the igno-
rance that appears as racism.' '1 46
Our everyday understanding of colorblindness as racism's opposite is
reflected in statements like "I don't think of you as black" and, still more
obviously, "whether they were black, pink, or purple . . . I don't think
there's much difference . . . "147 Certainly such proclamations are well-in-
tentioned, but there is reason to doubt both their honesty and their efficacy
in dealing with racism. As for their honesty, Joe Feagin's studies show that
the same people who profess colorblindness are actually not so colorblind
at all and know that society isn't either.1 48 Colorblindness, thus exposed, is
one of what Feagin calls "sincere fictions of the white self.' 1 49 As for its
141. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980).
142. Gary Peller, Race Consciousness, 1990 DUKE L.J. 758 (1990).
143. Id. at 760.
144. Id. at 764 (emphasis added).
145. Id. at 768.
146. Id. at 768-69.
147. Excerpts from a white business executive's articulation of his personal views on the rele-
vance of race, quoted in JOE R. FEAGIN & EILEEN O'BRIEN, WHITE MEN ON RACE: POWER,
PRIVILEGE, AND THE SHAPING OF CULTURAL CONSCIOUSNESS 73 (2003). As Feagin and O'Brien
write, "The phrase 'whether they were black, pink, or purple' is a common indicator of color-
blind discourse, which interestingly mixes a category of real racial significance in society (black)
in the same list with meaningless categories that do not signal real racial realities (pink and
purple)."
148. Id. at 73. See also David Strauss, The Myth of Colorblindness, 1986 SuP. CT. REV. 99
(1986).
149. The naming of nonracial categories (green and purple seem to be favorites in such
lists) is common among many whites who comment on how they see racial matters in
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efficacy, I would compare colorblindness rhetoric to our nearly universal
opposition to slavery or lynching, as interpreted by Reva Siegel. Oft-re-
peated condemnations of these practices are "presumably intended to bind
Americans ever more closely to principles of equality, [but they] may have
just the opposite effect. We have demonized subordinating practices of the
past to such a degree that [such condemnations] may instead function to
exonerate practices contested in the present."15 Correspondingly, color-
consciousness is so associated with the past practice of segregation, rightly
demonized, that we have adopted a rule of colorblindness so strict that its
effects are akin to those of segregation.
There is a sense in which colorblindness, especially on the level of ac-
tual, personal relations, is patently racist. A profession of colorblindness,
as Peller demonstrates, does not simply mean that the speaker thinks a
person's worth or dignity has no relation to the color of her skin; the imper-
ative of colorblindness often connotes a denial that race matters in any
sense at all, that there's no point in talking about race-related issues or, as
the colorblind person might put it, talking about "general" (perhaps class-
based?) issues "in terms of" race. This is a new phenomenon. Howard
Winant notes that in the past half-century we have developed "two ways of
looking at race," whereas in the past there was just one. Before World War
II, there was universal agreement around the existence of racial subordina-
tion, and the burning issue was whether that subordination was justified;
today, the debate is about whether there's subordination in the first
place:15 "the very idea that 'race matters' is something which today must
be argued, something which is not self-evident."' 52
Patricia Williams has offered a more specific description of how a cul-
ture of colorblindness very directly supports racial subordination. In a so-
ciety where racial difference is not something you're supposed to
acknowledge, you find, for example, that residents of a middle-class black
neighborhood will oppose a proposal to name a street in their town "Mar-
tin Luther King Boulevard" - not just from the stigma that will result from
the presumption that the neighborhood residents are black, but from their
own anxiety over the unconcealed color-consciousness of pride in the most
celebrated hero of black American history:
1 3
It seems to me that the "stigmatum" of "Dr. Martin Luther King
Boulevard" . . . is reflective of a deep personal discomfort among blacks,
a wordless and tabooed sense of self that is identical to the discomfort
shared by both blacks and whites in even mentioning words like "black"
and "race" in mixed company. Neutrality is from this perspective a sup-
pression, an institutionalization of psychic taboos as much as segregation
the United States. Such artificial categories are a clear indicator of the sincere fiction of
color-blindness. Yet the respondent himself then points out the contrast between his
color-blind ... ideals and the harsher societal reality, when the interviewer asks him
about how society really works. Even some who employ color-blind imagery realize that
it often does not reflect everyday reality.
FEAGIN & O'BRIEN, supra note 147, at 73; see also FEAGIN et al., supra note 117, at 186.
150. Siegel, supra note 10, at 1113.
151. Howard Winant, Racial Dualism at Century's End, in THE HOUSE THAT RACE BUILT:
BLACK AMERICANS, U.S. TERRAIN, supra note 53, at 87-88.
152. Id. at 88.
153. Patricia Williams, The Obliging Shell: An Informal Essay on Formal Equal Opportunity,
87 MICH. L. REV. 2128, 2139 (1989).
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was the institutionalization of physical boundaries. What the middle-class,
propertied, upwardly mobile black striver must do, to accommodate a
race-neutral world view, is to become an invisible black, a phantom-
black.
1 54
Having established that colorblindness is not necessarily the opposite
of racism, we can better appreciate how colorblindness is, empirically, to-
day, a manifestation of ignorance rather than a rejection of it. As an initial
matter, let's briefly examine the concept of colorblindness at face value. At
the risk of being guilty of the same literal-mindedness that besets those
who profess not to notice whether a person's "black, white, green, or pur-
ple," I will resort to another story narrated by Williams, one that exposes
the willful and ultimately cruel ignorance that colorblindness can be. Wil-
liams describes the hiring troubles of Radio City Music Hall's famous
Rockettes who, after years of resisting integration out of concern for their
hallmark symmetry, finally hired one black woman. 155
At the time of Williams' writing, this woman still had not performed
and was waiting in the wings, "on call for vacancies," but Williams was
troubled by the thought of the day this dancer would be introduced to the
audiences of Radio City: "There are infinite ways to get a racially mixed
lineup to look like a mirror image of itself. Hiring one black, however, is
not the way to do it. Hiring one and sticking her third to the left is a sure
way to make her stick out ... and the imprecision of the whole line will
devolve upon her. Hiring one black dancer and pretending that her color is
invisible is ".... an absurd type of twisted thinking, . . . racism-in-drag.'1 56
It's our fantasy of colorblindness - the flight of the imagination that we
really could put race out of our minds - that puts an unreasonable burden
on the sole black Rockette and on her audience. Evidently, this fantasy is
selective; the tokenism at play in Williams's story is plainly color-conscious,
but it's premised on the assumption, which the Rockette managers have
long known to be false, that color-consciousness will end there.
With her biting account of race and the Rockettes, Williams demon-
strates that we are not, in an important sense, colorblind. But is our consti-
tution? Is it always colorblind, or only sometimes? Despite the Supreme
Court's introduction in Grutter v. Bollinger of the importance of "context"
in equal protection review of race-based governmental action, it states in
the same breath that "all governmental uses of race are subject to strict
scrutiny."'1 57 This idea of the "colorblind Constitution" dates to the first
Justice Harlan's dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson,'58 but a full majority of the
Court did not settle on the principle until 1989 in Richmond v. J.A. Croson
Co.159 The doctrine is a purely judicial invention; not only did more than a
century pass before it became constitutional law, the framers of the Four-
teenth Amendment don't appear to have intended such a reading. 160
154. Id. at 2140.
155. Id. at 2138
156. Id. at 2137-38.
157. Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S.Ct. 2325, 2338 (2003).
158. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
159. Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
160. See Eric Schnapper, Affirmative Action and the Legislative History of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 71 VA. L. REV. 753 (1985); Laurence H. Tribe, In What Vision of the Constitution
Must the Law be Color-blind?, 20 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 201, 204 n.19 (1986). A number of vocal
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Somewhat astonishingly, given their ostensible preference for so-called
originalist constitutional interpretation, Justices Scalia and Thomas have
been the most absolutist proponents of colorblindness, although at least
four other members of the current Court subscribe to a version of the prin-
ciple that renders unconstitutional a considerable range of affirmative ac-
tion policies.16 1  Perhaps the most uncompromising articulation of the
colorblindness principle is found in Justice Scalia's concurring opinion in
Croson:
I agree.., that strict scrutiny must be applied to all governmental classifi-
cation by race, whether or not its asserted purpose is "remedial" or "be-
nign." . . . I do not agree ... [that] state and local governments may in
some circumstances discriminate on the basis of race in order . . . "to
ameliorate the effects of past discrimination." . . . The difficulty of over-
coming the effects of past discrimination is as nothing compared with the
difficulty of eradicating from our society the source of those effects, which
is the tendency... to classify and judge.., on the basis of... country of
origin or [skin color].... [O]nly a social emergency rising to the level of
imminent danger to life and limb - for example, a prison race riot, requir-
ing temporary segregation of inmates... - can justify an exception to the
principle embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment that "[o]ur Constitu-
tion is color-blind.'
162
In this section, I will show how Williams' story of a perversely inte-
grated Rockettes kick line is the physical embodiment of Justice Scalia's
meticulously colorblind interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause. The
literally willful blindness exposed by Williams in the context of Radio City
Music Hall has its doctrinal and theoretical equivalents in the similarly per-
nicious, but much more indelible, willful ignorances of the Supreme
Court's colorblindness jurisprudence.
The myth of colorblindness derives from deeper forms of cultural
blindness or, as Shoshana Felman would call them, "culture's blind
spots."'1 63 My analysis of the Court's affirmative action jurisprudence owes
much to Felman's brilliant take on the O.J. Simpson and Rodney King tri-
als, which she considers counterparts in their respective expositions of
things that still go willfully unseen in contemporary America. Both events,
she writes, were "about a beating - and about an unseen beating, about an
inexplicable, recalcitrant relation between beating and blindness, beating
and invisibility, and invisibility that cannot be dispelled in spite of the most
probatory visual evidence.' 1 64 The evidence to which Felman refers, of
course, is the image of Nicole Brown Simpson's horrifically bruised face
supporters of colorblindness doctrine concede that the principle cannot be traced to the Amend-
ment's framers. See, e.g., Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment
Problems, 47 IND. L. J. 1, 14 (1971); Richard A. Posner, The DeFunis Case and the Constitutional-
ity of Preferential Treatment of Racial Minorities, 1974 Sup. CT. REv. 1, 21-22 (1974); William Van
Alstyne, Rites of Passage: Race, the Supreme Court, and the Constitution, 46 U. CHI. L. REv. 775,
776 (1979).
161. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S.Ct. 2411 (2003) (striking down the affirmative action policy
of the College at the University of Michigan); Justices Kennedy, O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas
all joined the Chief Justice's majority opinion, while Justice Breyer wrote his own concurring
opinion and joined that of Justice O'Connor.
162. Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, at 735-36 (Scalia, J. concurring) (citations omitted)
(emphases added).
163. FELMAN, supra note 1, at 79.
164. Id. at 82
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and the shocking videotape of Rodney King's ghastly beating by police.
These judicial failures to see the obvious, to acknowledge "the very blows
that inflict trauma," in turn produce verdicts that are themselves "traumatic
in that they deny, in fact, the very trauma that the trial was supposed to
remedy."'65 Felman understands these failures of sight as willful, pur-
poseful, selective, and racialized. And she concludes, ultimately, that what
the juries fail to see in both cases is not just violence in the literal sense, but
"hate (hate for women [Brown Simpson], hate for blacks [King])."' 6 6
The affirmative action trials that have come before the Court (even
those that uphold the contested program) are uncanny parallels of the trials
analyzed by Felman. Their shared insistence upon colorblindness contains
within it judicial manifestations and validations of blindnesses - hate-based
blindnesses - that are deep and catastrophic limitations on the American
psyche. This section examines, first, the Court's willful blindness to present
reality and, second, its willfully amnesiac ignorance of history, both of
which are reflected in the constitutional doctrine of colorblindness, and
both of which reproduce the very traumas that affirmative action programs
(if we were honest about them) are meant to remedy. In Bakke, Croson,
Adarand, Grutter, and Gratz, if we read them right, we can see America's
blind spots.
A. (Color)Blindness to Reality
T. Alexander Aleinikoff and John Garvey point out that, even if we
understand the Equal Protection Clause to mean that "[t]he laws shall treat
all people alike," no one would seriously contend, for instance, that there's
any "constitutional harm in denying drivers' licenses to persons under
16. 1167 Therefore the provision might be more accurately read as requiring
that "[p]eople who are alike (in whatever way matters) shall be treated
alike by the laws."' 68 The constitutional doctrine of colorblindness is pre-
mised upon the idea that blacks and whites are alike in all the ways that
constitutionally matter. This notion of sameness is a serious case of willful
ignorance - here one is reminded of Anatole France's observation that
"the law in its majestic equality forbids the rich and the poor alike from
sleeping under bridges"'169 - and this ignorance has resulted in a begrudg-
ing and disabled Fourteenth Amendment with regard to black Americans.
There is another ignorance, this one quite literal, that allows the same-
ness notion to thrive among whites - namely, their ignorance of blacks.
This phenomenon is nicely illustrated in the recollections of a successful
white businessman interviewed by sociologists Joe Feagin and Eileen
O'Brien. Asked about his first contact with a black person, the subject
answered with a story that will be familiar to many white readers:
165. Id.
166. Id. at 83
167. T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF & JOHN H. GARVEY, MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY:
A READER 312 (1989).
168. Id.
169. The full quotation is "The law, in its majestic equality, forbids the rich and poor alike
from sleeping under bridges, as well as from begging in the streets and stealing bread." (La loi,
dans un grand souci d'galit, interdit aux riches comme aux pauvres de coucher sous les ponts, de
mendier dans les rues et de voler du pain.) ANATOLE FRANCE, LE Lys ROUGE (1894).
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I got to be almost in college .. .where I really started to come across
black people for the first time. It was almost as if, you know, we were
totally segregated from them .... I think the first black person I remem-
ber was when I worked in [names store] and he was a salesman inside,
just an everyday type of person, but I was never, even to this day, con-
fronted with face-to-face living conditions, working conditions, with peo-
ple from cultures other than white. I have basically been immune from
that, so it's, so it's almost like ignorance.
170
Almost like ignorance? Compared to other racial groups in the United
States, whites live in striking isolation from people who are different from
them. By some accounts, residential segregation in this country is worse
than when formal segregation was still in place.'71 When researchers from
the New York Times did field research in and around Chicago, a city whose
neighborhoods and suburbs know intense racial segregation, many whites
were found to be living their entire lives "without ever getting to know a
black person."'1 72 The reverse, however, was very rarely true; the vast ma-
jority of blacks necessarily interacted with whites a great deal.173 Hence an
important difference between whites' fears and suspicions of blacks and
blacks' fears and suspicions of whites - the apprehensions of blacks were
based on actual interaction, while the apprehensions of whites were based
on a lack of interaction. 74
It should be remembered that white ignorance of black people, this
simple lack of experience, not only fuels racism but is fueled by it. Segrega-
tion "is a basic part of the social process whereby systemic racism is repro-
duced from one generation to the next, [breeding] significant social and
mental isolation. ' 175 A 1992 study of Detroit and its suburbs found that
40% of whites said they would be unwilling to move to an area where
blacks constituted 20% of the population; 30% said they would feel uncom-
fortable living there; and 15% said they would try to move from the area if
they lived there already. Were a neighborhood to be majority-black - 53%
was the figure used - 71% of whites would not wish to move there, 65%
would be uncomfortable, and 53% would try to leave. 176 These astounding
figures, remember, are based on what white respondents actually report; as
we noted earlier, "stark disparities emerge" when sociologists compare
what whites actually do with their professed self-expectations.
77
Whites' very real ignorance of black Americans means that they gen-
erally lack a knowledge of "the objective conditions of life" for blacks and
the "consciousness associated with those conditions" - elements of a "vic-
tim perspective" that Alan Freeman understands as vital to fair adjudica-
170. FEAGIN & O'BRIEN, supra note 147, at 32 (emphasis added).
171. JOE R. FEAGIN, RACIST AMERICA: RooTs, CURRENT REALITIES, AND FUTURE REPRE-
SENTATIONS 132 (2000).
172. Isabel Wilkerson, The Tallest Fence: Feelings on Race in a White Neighborhood, N.Y.
TIMES, June 21, 1992, at A18.
173. Most black Americans work, shop, or travel with large numbers of whites, whereas rela-
tively few white Americans have such extensive interactions with large numbers of blacks. FEA-
GIN, supra note 171, at 132.
174. See Wilkerson, supra note 172.
175. FEAGIN, supra note 171, at 132.
176. Reynolds Farley et al., Stereotypes and Segregation: Neighborhoods in the Detroit Area,
100 AM. J. Soc. 756 (1994).
177. Brown, supra note 75, at 526.
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tion of minorities' constitutional claims.178 To put it another way, whites'
ignorance of black people contributes to their ignorance of the realities of
being black in the United States,'1 79 a condition that allows for the myth of
colorblindness to pervade whites' understanding of race as well as the Su-
preme Court's interpretations of the Equal Protection Clause.
The Plessy Court's statement that racial segregation was a badge of
inferiority only insofar as "the colored race chooses to put that construc-
tion upon it"'8 ° is a stark example of the effect of reality-blindness on doc-
trinal interpretation. So, too, is Herbert Wechsler's legendary argument, in
much the same vein, that he could find no "neutral principle" to justify the
Court's decision in Brown. 8' Wechsler, good liberal that he was, disdained
racial segregation, but he was so ensconced in the formalist fantasy of
"neutral principles" (colorblindness sounds like just such a fantasy, doesn't
it?) that he simply couldn't see how the Equal Protection Clause mandated
an end to the purely hypothetical regime of separate-but-equal. One way
to explain Wechsler's lack of imagination was his willful ignorance of both
the "objective conditions" of segregation and the "consciousness associated
with those conditions." Charles Black argued in his famous reply to
Wechsler's article that the Warren Court, thank goodness, did not suffer
from these deficiencies. He thought the answer to Wechsler's conundrum
was "awkwardly simple": "The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment should be read as saying that the Negro race, as such, is not to
be significantly disadvantaged by the laws of the states ... Segregation is a
massive intentional disadvantaging of the Negro race, as such, by state
law."' 82 I think it goes without saying that if Wechsler were black (not just
Charles Black) he probably would have come to the same conclusion.
Ignorance of blacks' experiences contributes powerfully to the idea,
central to colorblindness doctrine, that "we're all alike" in the ways that
are, or should be, legally relevant. Critical race theorists, however, have
amply shown how this idea turns a defiant blind eye to the painful facts of
real life. As KimberlM Crenshaw says, a "belief in colorblindness ...
[makes] no sense at all in a society in which identifiable groups had actually
been treated differently historically and in which the effects of this differ-
ence in treatment continued into the present.', 183 One of the most in-
sightful explanations of how blacks and whites are not "all alike" in ways
that are constitutionally relevant is the theory, suggested by Derrick Bell
and elaborated by Cheryl Harris, of a property right in whiteness. 84 Their
178. Freeman, supra note 9, at 29.
179. Asked whether blacks' quality of life had improved in the preceding decade, almost 60%
of white Pennsylvanians said "yes" and less than 30% of blacks said "no." Matthew P. Smith,
Bridging the Gulf Between Blacks and Whites, PITrSBURGH POsT-GAZE1TE, April 7, 1996, at Al.
180. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896).
181. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1
(1959).
182. Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L. J. 421, 421
(1960)
183. Kimberl6 Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Le-
gitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1345 (1988).
184. See generally Derrick A. Bell, Property Rights in Whiteness - Their Legal Legacy, the
Economic Costs, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE CU-rING EDGE (Richard Delgado & Jean
Stefancic eds., 2d ed. 2000); Cheryl Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 1708 (1993).
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central idea is that being white is a privilege of significant worth, whose
benefits "whites have come to expect and rely on" and whose legitimacy
has been "affirmed ... and protected by the law.' 1 85 While this property
right was nearly explicitly recognized in Plessy v. Ferguson,'8 6 Bell writes
that today "the passwords for gaining judicial recognition of the still viable
property right in being white include 'higher entrance scores,' 'seniority,'
and 'neighborhood schools'."' 87 Ultimately, concludes Harris, "[w]hiteness
- the right to white identity as embraced by law - is property if by property
one means all of a person's legal rights."'18 8 Thus affirmative action is, in
light of the property right identified by Harris and Bell, a mechanism that
"levels ... racial privilege. "189
Vada Berger, a white woman, recognizes the extent of her advantage
over black women and men: "[E]very day of our lives," she writes, "we
whites benefit from [our] white privilege. This means we are enjoying ben-
efits.., not fairly ours, that we have not worked for and often do not need,
at another's expense."1 9° Most whites, unfortunately, would not make the
same confession. A 1997 ABC/Washington Post poll found that, while 44%
of black Americans believe there is a lot of racial discrimination, only 17%
of whites agree.19' A recent survey of Massachusetts residents found that a
majority of white respondents think that racial minorities have the same
life chances as whites, an opinion that is incontestably refuted by official
government statistics.
192
To some extent, whites' ignorance of their privilege is understandable;
it's said that the fish is the last to know it's in water and, similarly, "those
privileged by color . . . are often ignorant of the ways their liberty and
choices are enhanced while those of people of color are diminished."'' 93 But
there's more to the denial than that. For a white person to acknowledge
her skin color as a kind of property right means "recognizing significant
racial disparities in the societal fabric," an acknowledgement that, as Fea-
gin and O'Brien write, undermines the very colorblindness regime that pre-
vents the law from redistributing the "unearned advantages one receives
solely by virtue" of whiteness.' 94 Thus an element of willfulness is inherent
in whites' ignorance of their privilege. Comedian Chris Rock put it best:
185. Harris, supra note 184, at 1713. "Whiteness defined the legal status of a person as slave
or free. White identity conferred tangible and economically valuable benefits and was jealously
guarded as a valued possession, allowed only to those who met a strict standard of proof." Id. at
1726.
186. Derrick Bell, Xerces and the Affirmative Action Myth, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1595, 1602
(1989).
187. Bell, Property Rights in Whiteness, supra note 184, at 77.
188. Harris, supra note 184, at 1726.
189. Id. at 1786.
190. Vada Berger, Searching for the Innocent, White Victim, excerpted in Derrick A. Bell et al.,
Racial Reflections: Dialogues in the Direction of Liberation, in CRITICAL WHITE STUDIES: LOOK-
ING BEYOND THE MIRROR 109 (Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic eds., 1997).
191. Robert J. Blendon et al., The Public and the President's Commission on Race, in THE
PUBLIC PERSPECTIVE 66, 67 (1998).
192. Scot Lehigh, "Conflicting Views of Massachusetts; Poll Shows a Sharp Racial Divide
Over the State of Equality," BOSTON GLOBE, June 14, 1998, at B1.
193. Dwight L. Greene, Justice Scalia and Tonto, Judicial Pluralistic Ignorance, and the Myth
of Colorless Individualism in Bostick v. Florida, 67 TUL. L. REV. 1979, 1981 (1993).
194. FEAGIN & O'BRIEN, supra note 147, at 72.
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"There ain't no white man in this room that will change places with me -
and I'm rich ... There's a one-legged busboy in here right now that's going
'I don't want to change. I'm gonna ride this white thing out and see where
it takes me."195
So whites and blacks are not "all alike." But the doctrine of color-
blindness would suggest that they are, as the dissenters in the Supreme
Court's first affirmative action decision protested. In Regents of University
of California v. Bakke, the Court struck down a state school's use of racial
quotas in its affirmative action admissions plan. While the majority of a
very split court determined that no affirmative action program could with-
stand strict scrutiny with reparations as its justification, five Justices agreed
that classroom and campus diversity were compelling enough interests to
satisfy exacting equal protection review. Four members of the Court, how-
ever, thought "claims that law must be 'color-blind' or that the datum of
race is no longer relevant to public policy must be seen as aspiration rather
than as description of reality.... [W]e cannot.., let colorblindness become
myopia which masks the reality that many 'created equal' have been
treated within our lifetimes as inferior both by the law and by their fellow
citizens." 1
96
In his own dissent in Bakke, Justice Marshall admonished the majority
for its blindness to reality by presenting a thorough statistical catalogue of
the many ways that, "measured by any benchmark of comfort or achieve-
ment, meaningful equality remains a distant dream for the Negro." 197
Nearly twenty years after Bakke, Justice Ginsburg, dissenting in the affirm-
ative action case Adarand Constructors v. Pena, issued another insistence
that a general rule of colorblindness need not entail a hard-and-fast rule of
reality-blindness; like Marshall, Ginsburg presented detailed statistical evi-
dence to highlight the absurdity of the majority's uncompromising color-
blindness requirement.198 Where Charles Black argued, in defense of
195. See BROWN ET AL., supra note 123, at 34.
196. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 327 (1978) (Blackmun, Brennan,
Marshall, & White, JJ., dissenting).
197. Measured by any benchmark of comfort or achievement, meaningful equality re-
mains a distant dream for the Negro. A Negro child today has a life expectancy which is
shorter by more than five years than that of a white child. The Negro child's mother is
over three times more likely to die of complications in childbirth, and the infant mortal-
ity rate for Negroes is nearly twice that for whites. The median income of the Negro
family is only 60% that of the median of a white family, and the percentage of Negroes
who live in families with incomes below the poverty line is nearly four times greater
than that of whites. When the Negro child reaches working age, he finds that America
offers him significantly less than it offers his white counterpart. For Negro adults, the
unemployment rate is twice that of whites, and the unemployment rate for Negro teen-
agers is nearly three times that of white teenagers. A Negro male who completes four
years of college can expect a median annual income of merely $110 more than a white
male who has only a high school diploma. Although Negroes represent 11.5% of the
population, they are only 1.2% of the lawyers, and judges, 2% of the physicians, 2.3% of
the dentists, 1.1% of the engineers and 2.6% of the college and university professors.
Id. at 395-96, (Marshall, J., dissenting, citations omitted).
198. Trying to salvage what she could from a majority opinion that adopted a highly formalis-
tic understanding of colorblindness, Justice Ginsburg wrote that she applauded:
the Court's recognition of the persistence of racial inequality and a majority's acknowl-
edgment of Congress' authority to act affirmatively, not only to end discrimination, but
also to counteract discrimination's lingering effects. Those effects, reflective of a system
of racial caste only recently ended, are evident in our workplaces, markets, and neigh-
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Brown, that the "purpose and impact of segregation... [were] matters not
so much for judicial notice as for the background knowledge of educated
men who live in the world," '1 9 9 Justices Marshall and Ginsburg have argued,
in defense of affirmative action, that the realities which the Court ignores
are or should be part of the background knowledge of any conscious
American.
Alan Freeman has effectively argued that the Court's blindness-
through-colorblindness is racist - not just in effect, but in its very content
and implications. Freeman asks us to imagine a nation that has achieved
what all the Justices seem to agree is the American ideal: "the future soci-
ety of racial irrelevance. '20 0 In Freeman's hypothetical, we discover in the
future society conditions that might, in other contexts, be understood as a
pattern of racial discrimination; one race tends to occupy the worst housing
and the worst jobs, and it has the least control over society's resources.
"For such conditions to be fair and accepted as legitimate," argues Free-
man, "they would have to be perceived as produced by accidental, impar-
tial, and neutral phenomena utterly dissociated from any racist practice. '20 1
This perception is dangerously close to Lochner-era free-marketplace ide-
ology, which Crenshaw acutely notes "constitutionalized [in Plessy] the
massive inequality of separate-but-equal" and "is reincarnated in color-
blind jurisprudence," where it has the effect of representing "contemporary
race hierarchy.., as a natural outgrowth of cultural disability. ' 20 2 In other
words, if discrimination doesn't explain current disparities, then there must
be something about those blacks - they're lazy, they're stupid, they're
spoiled, or some such nonsense. It's one or the other; we're faced with a
choice between a racist interpretation and an interpretation that accounts
for racism.
Thus Freeman and Crenshaw expose how the doctrine of colorblind-
ness, which makes colorblindness both an empirical approach and a norma-
tive goal, functions as a means of preserving racist perceptions of blacks.
And here we see the link between the colorblindness doctrine adopted by
the Supreme Court and, for example, the impression of a majority of whites
that racial inequality in jobs, housing, and income stems not from discrimi-
nation, but from blacks' lack of motivation.20 3 When the Court ignores
borhoods. Job applicants with identical r6sumds, qualifications, and interview styles still
experience different receptions, depending on their race. White and African-American
consumers still encounter different deals. People of color looking for housing still face
discriminatory treatment by landlords, real estate agents, and mortgage lenders. Minor-
ity entrepreneurs sometimes fail to gain contracts though they are the low bidders, and
they are sometimes refused work even after winning contracts. Bias both conscious and
unconscious, reflecting traditional and unexamined habits of thought, keeps up barriers
that must come down if equal opportunity and nondiscrimination are ever genuinely to
become this country's law and practice.
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 273 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting, citations
omitted).
199. Black, supra note 182, at 426.
200. Freeman, supra note 9, at 35.
201. Id.
202. Kimberl6 Williams Crenshaw, Colorblindness, History, and the Law, in THE HOUSE THAT
RACE BUILT: BLACK AMERICANS, U.S. TERRAIN 13, at 284.
203. See Smith, supra note 179.
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reality through colorblindness, it must take some responsibility for exacer-
bating the patently racist reality-ignorance of the American people.
B. Color(Blindness) to History
Justice Holmes believed that "history must be a part of the study [of
law],... because it is a first step toward an enlightened skepticism, that is,
toward a deliberate reconsideration of the worth of [the legal] rules."2 °4
Film critic Joel Siegel believed that "some movies, like some farts, are so
rank that you're left with only two options: pretending that they never hap-
pened or assaulting the perpetrators."2 5 I posit here that the constitu-
tional rule of colorblindness warrants "deliberate reconsideration" in light
of history, and that the historical amnesia evident in equal protection doc-
trine manifests a judicial tendency to pretend that the rankest of farts
didn't happen. Like Kimberld Crenshaw, I argue that it is largely through
colorblindness - "this ahistoricism, this willful inattention to the historical
operations of white supremacy" - that the Supreme Court and the Ameri-
can people wrongly presume "a discontinuity between past and present. 20 6
The contemporary realities discussed in the previous section are, of
course, intimately connected to historical realities. Justice Marshall's reci-
tation in his Bakke dissent of then-current statistics on racial disparity was
followed by the observation that "the relationship between those figures
and the history of unequal treatment afforded to the Negro cannot be de-
nied. At every point from birth to death the impact of the past is reflected
in the still disfavored position of the Negro. '20 7 Here Justice Marshall ar-
ticulates the position of those who favor at least selective color-conscious-
ness - those who, as Peller explains, view race in the context of American
history, "where racial identity was seen as a central basis for compre-
hending the significance of various social relations as they are actually lived
and experienced, and within which the meaning of race was anything but
symmetrical. '20 8 Proponents of color-consciousness acknowledge what
Neil Gotanda has called "historical-race," which gives substance to racial
categories insofar as they embody historical racial subordination. 20 9 This
perspective is fundamentally at odds with the project of strict integration-
ists, mainly good white liberals who understand "race through the prism of
universalism - from within which race consciousness appeared arbitrary,
irrational, and symmetrically evil whether practiced by whites or blacks.1
2 10
204. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897).
205. Joel Siegel, Critical Passages: Our Favorite Joel Siegel Lines, WASH. CITY PAPER, Mar. 19-
25, 2004 at http://www.washingtoncitypaper.com/special/joel/joelquotes03l9.html.
206. Crenshaw, supra note 202, at 281 (emphasis added). Elsewhere Crenshaw writes, "This
belief in color-blindness and equal process, however, would make no sense at all in a society in
which identifiable groups had actually been treated differently historically and in which the ef-
fects of this difference in treatment continued into the present." Crenshaw, supra note 183, at
1345.
207. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 396 (1978) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
208. Pellet, supra note 142, at 791.
209. Neil Gotanda, A Critique of a Colorblind Constitution, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1, 4 (1991).
210. Peller, supra note 142, at 791. The color-conscious mechanism of affirmative action is,
for most white liberals, an integrationist project. But this fact alone doesn't mean that these same
proponents of affirmative action question the ultimate ideal of colorblindness. Affirmative ac-
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Ignorance of America's racial history and the reach of that history into
the present is, it seems, a national epidemic. 211 White school children may
be taught to be ashamed of slavery, but very rarely are they taught that
there is a connection between centuries of black bondage and the tremen-
dous social and economic disadvantage of being black today. Instead
Americans are being told precisely the opposite: "We all agree that slavery
was evil, but the blood of slavery does not stain modern mainstream
America. "212 Lamenting this amnesia as a major obstacle in the national
dialogue on race, Patricia Williams writes that "[i]f we could press on to a
conversation that takes into account the devastating legacy of slavery that
lives on as a social crisis that needs generations more of us working to
repair - if we could just get to the enormity of that unhappy acknowledge-
ment, then that alone might be the source of a genuinely revivifying, rather
than a false, optimism. '213 Unfortunately this acknowledgement becomes
harder, not easier, to manage as Americans grow increasingly unfamiliar
with the era of lynching and segregation and the intervention of the civil
rights movement, firsthand and obvious lessons in slavery's legacy. Indeed,
one recent survey found that nearly two-thirds of white Americans don't
think that whites as a group have benefited from past or present discrimi-
nation against black Americans.21 4 If that's not willful ignorance, I don't
know what is.
The Supreme Court has not always blindly reflected and indulged the
nation's historical amnesia with regard to race. Warren Court decisions
like Brown and Loving v. Virginia, both of which invalidated laws that ap-
plied "equally" to both races, demonstrated a judicial refusal to ignore the
obvious, present relevance of history. Brown effectively overturned Plessy,
the case where the Court chose to define equality as no more than formally
symmetrical treatment by "render[ing] the social, material context of segre-
gation as well as its effects ... private or unknowable. ' 215 But context is
everything in Brown, whose approach "begins and ends with historical
fact." The Court starts with a review of "the [Fourteenth] Amendment's
history with respect to segregated schools," and proceeds to discuss the
state of "Negro education" in both the North and the South in the after-
math of the Civil War, noting that in some areas "any education of Negroes
was forbidden by law." '2 1 6 To properly determine whether "segregation...
deprives [the] plaintiffs of equal protection of the laws," the Brown Court
insisted that text could not be divorced from historical and present context,
that "we cannot turn the clock back to 1868 when the Amendment was
adopted, or even to 1896 when Plessy v. Ferguson was written. We must
tion, under this view, is perceived as a temporary and unfortunate aberration from the otherwise
legitimate colorblindness requirement.
211. James Baldwin wrote that this country's "failure to face [its] genocidal history ... has
placed everyone now living into the hands of the most ignorant ... people the world has ever
seen." James Baldwin, On Being 'White'... and Other Lies, in BLACK ON WHITE: BLACK WRIT-
ERS ON WHAT IT MEANS To BE WHITE 177 (David R. Roediger ed., Schocken Books 1998)
(1984).
212. Refocus Racism Conference Agenda, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 13, 2001, at A17.
213. PATRICIA WILLIAMS, THE ROOSTER'S EGG 78 (Harvard University Press 1995).
214. Blendon et al., supra note 191, at 67.
215. Crenshaw, supra note 202, at 282 (emphasis added).
216. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. 347 U.S. 483, at 489-90 (emphasis added).
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consider public education in the light of its full development and its present
place in American life throughout the Nation." '217 Brown is historical not
only in its impact, but in its approach, which is why Shoshana Felman un-
derstands it to be one of the events that continued a novel and laudable
twentieth-century trend, begun at Nuremberg, of putting history itself on
trial.218 And in Loving, the Court was even more candid in its attentive-
ness to the historical contingency of Virginia's purportedly race-neutral
miscegenation law, which, "passed during [a] period of extreme nativ-
ism," '219 was "designed to maintain White Supremacy."220
The historical consciousness of the Warren Court was a short-lived
moment in constitutional jurisprudence on race. The Burger Court's ruling
in Bakke (there was no majority decision, but Justice Powell's opinion,
which spoke only for himself, soon gained precedent-like stature)221 exem-
plified the amnesia that afflicts the contemporary Court. Though Powell's
Bakke opinion has been elaborated by a majority of the Court in the recent
cases Grutter and Gratz,222 I focus here on Bakke because it set the tone
and established the terms for constitutional evaluation of affirmative action
programs in general and academic ones in particular.
The first matter of business in Bakke was deciding which level of scru-
tiny to apply to the admissions system used by the Medical School at the
University of California at Davis. Those Justices who reached the constitu-
tional question - four would have struck down the affirmative action pro-
gram under Title V12 23 - agreed that all race-based classifications, even if
"benign" in intent, warrant the strictest scrutiny. But at the level of rheto-
ric, there were clear distinctions between Justice Powell and Justices Black-
mun, Brennan, Marshall, and White. Powell justified the choice of strict
scrutiny with the contention that there are "dozens of minority groups"
that could "lay claim to a history of prior discrimination at the hands of the
State and prior individuals. '224 He could find "no principled basis for de-
ciding which groups would merit 'heightened judicial solicitude' and which
would not.
225
217. Id. at 492-93.
218. Until the middle of the twentieth century, a radical division between history and
justice was in principle maintained. The law perceived itself either as ahistorical or as
expressing a specific stage in society's historical development. But law and history were
separate. The courts sometimes acknowledged that they were part of history, but they
did not judge history as such. This state of affairs has changed since the constitution of
the Nuremberg tribunal, which ... for the first time called history itself into a court of
justice. . . . Not only has it become thinkable to put history on trial, it has become
judicially necessary to do so.
FELMAN, supra note 1, at 11.
219. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 6 (1967).
220. Id. at 11.
221. Justice O'Connor noted, "Since this Court's splintered decision in Bakke, Justice Powell's
opinion announcing the judgment of the Court has served as the touchstone for constitutional
analysis of race-conscious admissions policies. Public and private universities across the Nation
have modeled their own admissions programs on Justice Powell's views on permissible race-con-
scious policies." Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S.Ct. 2325, 2336 (2003).
222. See id. and Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S.Ct. 2411 (2003).
223. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 408-21 (1978) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
224. Id. at 297 n. 36, 296 (Powell, J.).
225. Id. at 294-6 (Powell, J.).
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The concurring-dissenting Justices, on the other hand, thought it "nec-
essary to define with precision the meaning of that inexact term, 'strict
scrutiny'. '"226 They reasoned that strict scrutiny in race cases entails "a
number of considerations," resembling, but more forceful than, those iden-
tified in gender-discrimination cases.22 7 Such considerations, they said,
would more than sufficiently deal with claims to "heightened judicial solici-
tude" by various ethnic groups. With an eye on history, these Justices pre-
dicted that a demand by German-Americans for preferential treatment
"would create [a] relatively simple problem for the Court. '2 28
It was Justice Marshall's solo opinion in Bakke that most aggressively
challenged the willful ahistoricism of Justice Powell's floodgates justifica-
tion for applying strict scrutiny: "The experience of Negroes in America
has been different in kind, not just in degree, from that of other ethnic
groups. It is not merely the history of slavery alone but also that a whole
people were marked as inferior by law. And that mark has endured. The
dream of America as the great melting pot has not been realized for the
Negro; because of his skin color he never even made it into the pot.
2 29
The next constitutional question in Bakke was whether the Medical
School's admissions program could withstand strict scrutiny. The most in-
tuitively compelling justification for affirmative action - remedying the ef-
fects of past societal discrimination - was not, in the view of Justice Powell,
constitutionally satisfactory: Couldn't almost any group make a claim to
reparations? 230 He determined that a school could use affirmative action
either to compensate for its own well-documented past discrimination or to
foster diversity within the student body.231 And so it is the diversity ratio-
nale - the justification most divorced from history, most divorced from any
desire to improve the present condition of blacks, and most related to the
quality of education afforded predominantly white student bodies - that
saved affirmative action at the University of California and the rest of
America's universities. Last year a majority of the Court affirmed this jus-
tification as constitutionally acceptable, and by that time no one even dared
to whisper the word "reparations" or its less provocative euphemisms.232
Remedying the effects of past societal discrimination was clearly, in
the eyes of the four concurring-dissenting Justices in Bakke, a constitution-
ally legitimate justification for the affirmative action plan at issue. In light
of American history - legal and political, social and economic - they could
not see how the University of California could not "conclude that the seri-
ous and persistent underrepresentation of minorities in medicine ... is the
result of handicaps under which minority applicants labor as a consequence
of deliberate, purposeful discrimination against minorities in education and
226. Id. at 357 (Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, JJ., dissenting).
227. Id. at 359.
228. Id. at 358 n.35.
229. Id. at 400-01 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
230. Id. at 295, n. 34.
231. Id. at 307-09. 311-20.
232. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S.Ct. 2325, 2348 (2003). Diversity was the only rationale
offered by the University of Michigan Law School to justify its use of affirmative action in
admissions.
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in society generally," discrimination to which blacks, in particular, have
been subjected "from the inception of our national life." '233
To Justice Marshall, affirmative action as a constitutionally valid rem-
edy for past societal discrimination was practically self-evident if one did
not forget history and the Court's role in history, but instead "remembered
that, during most of the past 200 years, the Constitution as interpreted by
this Court did not prohibit the most ingenious and pervasive forms of dis-
crimination against the Negro. "234 Marshall's opinion recounted a "history
... perhaps too well-known to require documentation," but his first foot-
note acknowledged the great historians upon whose work he relied: John
Hope Franklin, Richard Kluger, and C. Vann Woodward. 235 He went on to
summarize 350 years of American racism: the middle passage ("the Negro
was dragged to this country in chains"); slavery ("thrust into bondage for
forced labor... [the slave] could be sold away from his family and friends
at the whim of his master; and killing or maiming him was not a crime");
the beginning of the Jim Crow era ("first steps to re-enslave the Negroes");
the flowering of segregation (quoting Woodward, even "a Jim Crow Bible
for colored witnesses to kiss"); and the contemporary plight of the black
American ("the tragic but inevitable consequence of centuries of unequal
treatment"). 236 This is the history to which Justice Powell is willfully blind:
"I do not believe," wrote Marshall, "that anyone can truly look into
America's past and still find that a remedy for the effects of that past is
impermissible."237
The strict rule of colorblindness has not only obscured the Court's ob-
stinate ignorance of history in its choice of "the most searching scrutiny"
for benign racial classifications and its rejection of a reparations-based jus-
tification for affirmative action. Historical amnesia manifests once more in
the standards set by the Court for a finding of past discrimination with
regard to a particular actor, institution, or industry, which is, aside from
diversity, the only constitutionally acceptable rationale for an affirmative
action program. These standards were rigidly enunciated in Richmond v.
J.A. Croson Co., where the Court struck down the Virginia capital's re-
quirement that at least 30% of its construction contracts be granted to "mi-
nority business enterprises., 238 The Court's neglect of historical reality in
Croson is blindness at its most willful, as many commentators have skill-
fully and scathingly demonstrated. 239 The Croson opinion is the judicial
equivalent of the opinion among white Americans, cited earlier, that whites
have not benefited from past or present discrimination against blacks.24 °
Writing for a plurality of the Court, Justice O'Connor succinctly re-
viewed and rejected the evidence set forth by the City of Richmond to
justify its use of a racial quota for construction contracts:
233. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 370-71 (Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, JJ., dissenting).
234. Id. at 387 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
235. Id. at 388 n.1.
236. Id. at 387-95.
237. Id. at 402 (emphasis added).
238. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 408-21 (1978).
239. See, e.g., Crenshaw, supra note 202; Thomas Ross, The Richmond Narratives, 68 TEX. L.
REV. 381 (1989).
240. See Blendon et al., supra note 191, at 178.
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The District Court relied upon five predicate 'facts' in reaching its conclu-
sion that there was an adequate basis for the 30% quota: (1) the ordi-
nance declares itself to be remedial; (2) several proponents of the
measure stated their views that there had been past discrimination in the
construction industry; (3) minority businesses received 0.67% of prime
contracts from the city while minorities constituted 50% of the city's pop-
ulation; (4) there were very few minority contractors in local and state
contractors' associations; and (5) in 1977, Congress made a determination
that the effects of past discrimination had stifled minority participation in
the construction industry nationally.
None of these 'findings,' singly or together, provide the city of Richmond
with a strong basis . . . for its conclusion that remedial action was
necessary. 24
1
It is interesting to note how Justice O'Connor's placement of quota-
tion marks around the words "facts" and "findings" functions much in the
same way, so wonderfully articulated by Eve Sedgwick, as Justice White's
use of the word "facetious" in his Bowers v. Hardwick opinion - namely,
"as a switch point for the cyclonic epistemological undertows" that permit
five powerful (white) people to determine what constitutes fact and what,
in Justice O'Connor's implication, constitutes fiction or is, at best, irrele-
vant.242 Her choice of punctuation impugns not only the facts, but also the
integrity of the advocates presenting them. In order for the Court to not
believe its eyes, it evidently must go out of its way to disbelieve those who
can see.
In Bowers, Justice Blackmun responded to Justice White's contemptu-
ous opinion by calling it an example of "the most willful blindness.
'243 Jus-
tice Marshall performs a similar role in Croson. "The majority," he wrote,
"takes an exceedingly myopic view of the factual predicate on which the
Richmond City Council relied" when it passed the set-aside plan; "[t]o sug-
gest that the facts ... do not provide a sound basis for its finding of past
racial discrimination simply blinks credibility."2" At one point in the opin-
ion, O'Connor seriously (seriously?) suggests that the reason less than 1%
of Richmond's construction contracts were given to black-owned enter-
prises, though blacks constituted a majority of the city's population, might
be that construction just isn't a business blacks are interested in pursu-
21ing.245 The difference between the races here is one of temperament only,
not status, not wealth, not access, not experience of the world. Like the
Lochner Court's insistence that bakers "freely" chose to work shifts of
more than ten hours, the court here "feigns ignorance," as Crenshaw puts
it, of centuries of coercion that have kept blacks out of this highly profita-
ble line of work.246
As Thomas Ross contends, the Justices in Croson "dispute whether...
history is legally relevant." Justice O'Connor's opinion explicitly rejects
241. Richmond v. J.A. Croson, .488 U.S. 469, at 499-500 (1978).
242. SEDGWICK, supra note 2, at 6.
243. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 205 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
244. Richmond v. J.A. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, at 530, 541 (emphases added).
245. "The 30% quota cannot be said to be narrowly tailored to any goal, except perhaps out-
right racial balancing. It rests upon the 'completely unrealistic' assumption that minorities will
choose a particular trade in lockstep proportion to their representation in the local population."
Id. at 507 (emphasis added).
246. Crenshaw, supra note 202, at 285.
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reference to deep and general patterns of historical discrimination to
demonstrate or implicate discrimination in a particular industry. Resorting
again to belittling punctuation, O'Connor writes that "the 'evidence' relied
upon by Justice Marshall's dissent - the city's history of school desegrega-
tion and numerous congressional reports - does little to define the scope of
any injury . . . [to] justify a preference of any size or duration." '247 But
Marshall's evidence - which was not, to say the least, "evidence" - is much
more extensive, more revealing, and more damning than the majority opin-
ion can stand to see. Like his opinion in Bakke, Marshall's Croson dissent
is from start to finish a substantial account of a "disgraceful history," his
first sentence setting the tone: "It is a welcome symbol of racial progress
when the former capital of the Confederacy acts forthrightly to confront
the effects of racial discrimination in its midst. ' 248 Unlike the Court major-
ity, says Marshall, the people of Richmond "know what racial discrimina-
tion is."'249 He notes that the city had come before the Justices and before
other courts in numerous race-discrimination cases: "the members of the
Richmond City Council have spent long years witnessing multifarious acts
of discrimination, including, but not limited to, the deliberate diminution of
black residents' voting rights, resistance to school desegregation, and pub-
licly sanctioned housing discrimination. '2 °5 And Marshall berates the ma-
jority for ignoring, for "refusing to recognize," for literally brushing aside
as having no probative value, the "rich trove of evidence," confirmed by
numerous federal reports, "that discrimination in the Nation's construction
industry . . . seriously impaired the competitive position of businesses
owned or controlled by minority groups. "251 For Justices Marshall, Black-
mun, and Brennan, "history is irrefutable. '25 2 For O'Connor and the rest
of the majority, history is out of their sight and out of their minds.
CONCLUSION: A WEB OF IGNORANCES
I have tried in this article to show how ignorance - sometimes genuine,
usually willful - infects contemporary interpretation of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause and renders it inadequate to the great task for which that provi-
sion was originally intended. 3 By requiring intent, the Court ignores the
prevalence of unconscious racism and thereby privileges our ignorance of
how we discriminate despite our best intentions. Having established the
intent requirement, the Court's ignorance of subjective mental states allows
it to recognize only the most blatant forms of discriminatory motivation,
thereby protecting those whose conscious discrimination is covered with
reasonable-sounding justifications. In its strict doctrine of constitutional
colorblindness, the Court willfully blinds itself to the realities of racial dis-
247. Richmond v. J.A. Croson, 488 U.S.. 469, at 471.
248. Id. at 528.
249. Id. at 529 (emphasis added).
250. Id. at 544.
251. Id. at 530.
252. Id. at 561 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
253. The Fourteenth Amendment was a "broad statement of principle, giving constitutional
form to the resolution of a national crisis." ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFIN-
ISHED REVOLUTION, 1863-1877 at 257 (1988).
NATIONAL BLACK LAW JOURNAL 281
parity in the United States and the dishonorable history that lies behind
those realities.
These ignorances have spun a constitutional web in which black Amer-
icans have long found themselves caught - the ignorances that run through
each of the doctrinal strands examined here support each other in highly
specifi6 ways. It seems clear that the form of unconscious racism called
white transparency - an ignorance that blinds white Americans to the racial
contingency of their culture, rules, methods, and values, 254 and is allowed
to flourish under the intent doctrine - is an important feature of what's
usually understood as colorblindness doctrine. For even when affirmative
action is sanctioned by the Court as an exception to the general rule of
colorblindness, it is simultaneously understood as an exception to some
generally meritocratic practice. If intent doctrine did not foreclose judicial
examination of the extent to which purportedly neutral standards of merit
are actually deeply entrenched, not-so-easily reformed, and usually uncon-
scious manifestations of white transparency, affirmative action would have
a less embattled career. The ignorance protected by intent, then, reinforces
the ignorance mandated by colorblindness.
We have seen how the intent requirement is premised upon a willful
ignorance of history insofar as it asks a victim of discrimination to identify
with specificity the perpetrator of the alleged violation. This amnesia is
obviously the same as the one we examined in the context of colorblind-
ness, but the manner in which it functions in the intent doctrine produces
particular consequences in the application of the colorblindness principle.
The ahistorical conditions of fault and causation that are implicit in intent
doctrine reinforce a pervasive notion of white innocence, whereby only a
few particularly malicious discriminators are "guilty" or unfairly benefited,
while most whites bear no responsibility whatsoever for remedying the un-
deniably disadvantageous position of blacks. As Thomas Ross asks, how-
ever, "[w]hat white person is 'innocent', if innocence is defined as the
absence of advantage at the expense of others? '255 Sadly, this notion of a
universal white innocence that has a few (but egregious) exceptions is cen-
tral to the colorblindness-premised affirmative action debate. Justice Pow-
ell's Bakke opinion lamented the unfairness of asking "innocent persons
... to endure... [deprivation as] the price of membership in the dominant
majority," a premise that has gone uncontested in every subsequent major-
ity opinion on affirmative action.256
The flip side of white innocence is a denial of black subordination,
which we see, for example, in Justice White's concurring opinion in the
affirmative action case Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, which stated
that "none of [the black plaintiffs] has been shown to be a victim of any
racial discrimination. '257 Such denial of the universality of black Ameri-
cans' experience of discrimination reinforces the willful ignorance of his-
tory and reality that enables the regime of colorblindness. Denial of black
victimhood contaminates the Court's affirmative action jurisprudence, as
254. See supra notes 88-94 and accompanying text.
255. Thomas Ross, Innocence and Affirmative Action, 43 VAND. L. REV. 297, 300-301 (1990).
256. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, at 295 n. 34 (1978).
257. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 295 (1986).
282 NATIONAL BLACK LAW JOURNAL
Justice Marshall protested in Bakke: "It is unnecessary in 20th-century
America to have individual Negroes demonstrate that they have been vic-
tims of racial discrimination; the racism of our society has been so perva-
sive that none, regardless of wealth or position, has managed to escape its
impact."'
These are just three examples of how the ignorances discussed
throughout this paper are interconnected in a web that traps black Ameri-
cans and offers up their viable equal protection claims to the arachnid doc-
trines of the contemporary Supreme Court. But such predation cannot
continue indefinitely. As Thomas Jefferson wrote in 1816, "If a nation ex-
pects to be ignorant and free, in a state of civilization, it expects what never
was and never will be."'2 58 And as Frederick Douglass said sixty years later:
"Where justice is denied,... where ignorance prevails, and where any one
class is made to feel that society is in an organized conspiracy to oppress,
rob, and degrade them, neither persons nor property will be safe. '259
By exposing ignorance at its most willful and damaging, I have at least
offered a useful lens through which to understand the contemporary failure
of equal protection jurisprudence. But my project is more ambitious than
that. I hope to have fulfilled on some level the rhetorical and moral trans-
formation contemplated by Shoshana Felman, who, reflecting on the O.J.
Simpson trial, asks whether, "the trial of the century,... the cultural story
of our blindness, could ... turn into the story of a revolutionary seeing?1261
I hope that this revelation of juridical ignorance and blindness is itself a
compulsion to know, an incitement to sight.
258. Letter to Charles Yancey, 1/6/1816.
259. Frederick Douglass, Southern Barbarism, Speech on the 24th Anniversary of Emancipa-
tion in the District of Columbia, Washington, D.C. (April 1886) in THE LIFE AND WRITINGS OF
FREDERICK DOUGLASS, at 434 (Foner ed., International Publishers 1975) (1955).
260. FELMAN, supra note 1, at 93.
